

**CULTURE AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF A CANADIAN AND CHINESE CASE**

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By

HU, Yue

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Mr. Yue Hu, candidate for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science, has presented a thesis titled, ***Culture and Cultural Diplomacy: A Comparative Study of a Canadian and Chinese Case***, in an oral examination held on March 30, 2011. The following committee members have found the thesis acceptable in form and content, and that the candidate demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of the subject material.

External Examiner: Dr. John Meehan, Campion College

Supervisor: Dr. Yuchao Zhu, Department of Political Science

Committee Member: Dr. Howard Leeson, Department of Political Science

Chair of Defense: Dr. Boting Yang, Department of Computer Science

*Not present at defense

ABSTRACT

Cultural diplomacy has become an important component of modern day diplomacy. The distinctive characteristics and functions of cultural diplomacy also attract scholarly attention. Although scholars attempt to understand cultural diplomacy from various angles, some questions remain unanswered. For example, do cultural diplomacies differ due to different cultures? If so, which aspect of the cultural diplomatic difference relates to the cultural difference? Are there other important factors, other than culture, influencing cultural diplomatic practices between states?

Essentially, questions, such as the aforementioned three, consider two linked issues. The first issue questions the differences in cultural diplomacy among different states. The second question ponders the relationship between the differences as it affects cultural differences between states. This thesis intends to investigate the two issues through a comparative study of Canadian and Chinese cultural diplomacies. The analyses will compare and contrast four main aspects of cultural diplomacies of two states, i.e. institutional setting, cultural strategy, diplomatic practice, and phasic result. The thesis argues that, despite some common ground in cultural diplomacy by different states, some obvious and culture-related differences do exist. Distinctive institutional settings, contents of cultural strategies, or different practical means and channels in cultural diplomacy may relate to their cultural characteristics. The thesis also argues that the factors influencing the characteristics of a state's cultural diplomacy are complex. Non-cultural factors also exert an impact, and in some cases, are more significant than cultural factors.

This study should deepen our understanding of cultural diplomatic differences among states, and more importantly, form an extensive connection between the distinctiveness of the culture of a state and its cultural diplomacy. Therefore, this thesis emphasizes the necessity to pay adequate attention to the influence of a culture's distinctive characteristics upon cultural diplomacy, which is often overlooked in existing cultural diplomacy studies. Additionally, different states have some common cultural diplomacy features and are affected by the effects of non-cultural factors. This also indicates the cultural diplomatic characteristics of a state are influenced by multiple factors. Thus, the thesis may lay a foundation based upon which to take a comprehensive view of cultural diplomacy in general.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BECR:	the Bureau for External Cultural Relations and Office for Cultural Affairs with Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Regions of Ministry of Culture of People's Republic of China
CCCPC:	The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.A.)
CIPG:	China International Publishing Group
CNNIC:	China Internet Network Information Center
CPC:	Communist Party of China
CPLR:	Central Party Literature Research Center of the Communist Party of China
CRTC:	Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission
DECE:	Department of International Cooperation and Exchanges (Office of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Affairs) of Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China
DFAIT:	Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
ECPL:	Editorial Committee on Party Literature of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
G8:	The Summit of the Americas and the Group of Eight
GAPP:	General Administration of Press and Publication of China
GATS:	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT:	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IMF:	International Monetary Fund

INCP:	International Network on Cultural Policy
ISF:	International Strategic Framework
MC:	Ministry of Culture of the People's Republic of China
ME:	Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China
MFN:	Most Favored Nation
NAFTA:	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS:	Organization for American States
PPP:	Gross Domestic Product per capita
PRC:	People's Republic of China
SARA:	State Administration for Religious Affairs of the Peoples' Republic of China
SARS:	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SCIO:	State Council Information Office
SCO:	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UN:	United Nations
UNEF:	United Nations Emergency Force
UNESCO:	United Nations Education, Science, and Cultural Organization
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
WTO:	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“Cultural diplomacy” is both an “old” and “new” term in the world of diplomacy. On one hand, the history of cultural exchange is almost as long as the history of diplomatic actions of human beings. In the third millennium B.C.E., in the Western world, cultural elements were engaged in the diplomatic behaviors of Sumerians;¹ also, at least 2600 years ago, in the Eastern world, cultural exchanges were an indispensable part of the Chinese people’s external communications.² And since the early period of modern diplomacy, “developing cultural relations [between the sending State and the receiving State]” has been regarded as a crucial duty of diplomats.³ On the other hand, cultural diplomacy was not extensively studied by scholars until the end of World War II. The post-war international environment provided a larger stage to cultural diplomacy which could be simply defined as a diplomatic form that *reaches foreign policy goals through cultural communications or other diplomatic activities relating with culture.*⁴ The increasing applications then attracted scholarly attention. Thereinafter, specific works extensively discussed many aspects of cultural diplomacy, such as its definition, characteristics, and restrictions. Yet, in a review of several important works regarding cultural diplomacy, one area, cultural diplomatic difference (and its relation with culture), may still be under-researched. There are quite a few questions relevant to this issue, such

¹ Richard T. Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, (Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2005), 2.

² Sun Xiaohua, “The Insights into Contemporary Ideological Education from the Moralization in Ancient China,” *Theory Learning*, vol.25 (2009):191.

³ *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* (1961), accessed Jan. 31st, 2010, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf, 3.

⁴ This is a brief description of “cultural diplomacy.” The exact definition of the term will be given in Chapter 3.

as whether cultural diplomacies, in different states, are also different, in what aspects might they be different, and what factors may lead to these differences? Although the connection between culture and cultural diplomacy is conspicuous, the awareness as to how this connection works remains vague. In other words, many scholars in the area of cultural diplomatic study may not, as yet, be sure how a state's culture can influence its cultural diplomacy. Most existing studies notice the distinctiveness of cultural diplomacy from other diplomatic forms, and attribute this distinctiveness to some features of culture.⁵ However, one aspect regarding the difference in cultures may be overlooked by the studies. Many cultures exist around the world, such as the Arab culture, Chinese culture, Western culture, etc. Do their cultures influence cultural diplomacy in the same way? If not, how is their influence different? Do cultural differences between states relate to their differences in cultural diplomatic practices?

All the aforementioned questions may not be answered completely in the existing studies. Thus, the potential contribution of this thesis is to comprehensively investigate cultural diplomatic differences, and provide a more in-depth understanding of the *relationship* between cultural differences and cultural diplomatic differences in order to answer the above cited questions. Herein, the term "relationship" is used as a broad concept, which includes various connections between cultural differences and cultural diplomatic practices, direct and indirect, at the same level or inter-level, and with or without clear causal links. However, focusing on this broad concept would not undermine the value of the research. Instead, it may contribute to a more comprehensive study, for

⁵ The "cultural differences" refer to differences on implication, pattern, preference, structure, influence in international politics, etc. which can distinguish one culture from another. The terms, such as "internal differences between cultures," "cultural diversity," "differences on cultural characteristics," and "mutual distinctions of cultures," have the same meaning of the "internal differences between cultures" in this thesis.

the relationship between cultural differences and cultural diplomatic differences may exist in various diplomatic actions Perhaps, a narrow view of the word “relationship” increases the risk of producing a fragmentary awareness, by contrast.

1.1 Theoretical Background and Research Approach

1.1.1 Theoretical Background

Since the 1940s,⁶ there has been research focusing specifically on cultural diplomacy. Most studies treat culture as a key factor making cultural diplomacy distinctive from other diplomatic forms. But, in these studies, culture usually appears much simpler than it really is. Differences in cultures are rarely considered. In other words, culture is applied as a factor regardless about inner differences; culture influences in similar ways the cultural diplomacy of every state to which it applies, such as the three most frequently mentioned common characteristics of cultural diplomacy, “extensiveness,” “non-violence,” and “imperceptibility.”

Firstly, cultural diplomacy can be extensively applied in modern diplomacies. By continually developing information and transportation technologies, culture has been able to disseminate via various channels and intermediaries and the established global information nets increase conveniences and the speed of this dissemination. The deepening of economic and political globalizations also lead to an unprecedented high frequency of international communications—opportunities to practice cultural dissemination. Based upon the aforementioned conditions, cultural dissemination not only lowers cultural diplomacy costs but also enhances the efficiency of diplomacy.⁷

⁶ Such as Ruth McMurry and Muna Lee, *The Cultural Approach: Another Way in International Relations* (Chapel Hill, Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1947).

⁷ William Rugh, “If Saddam had been a Fulbrighter...” *Christian Science Monitor* vol. 87 (1995):19.

Cultural dissemination also provides a common characteristic to cultural diplomacy, namely, “extensiveness.” That is, a state can apply cultural diplomacies via various channels, and cultural diplomacies can be used for many types of diplomatic purposes (partially due to low costs).

Secondly, cultural diplomacy is non-violent. This characteristic can also be attributed to the influence of the common feature of culture. Cultural communication usually aims at “a goal exchanging of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding.”⁸ Cultural diplomacy appears to not be directly responsible for casualties to soldiers, cessions of territories or sovereignties, or tangible losses in trade. On the contrary, both sides, the sender and receiver of cultural diplomatic actions, can expect to benefit by absorbing new experiences and ideas from other cultures. Even though the benefits may not be significant, there appears to be little obvious loss or cost to either side. This apparently non-violent characteristic may lead to a reduction in vigilance of target countries, while increasing their expectation of a mutually beneficial result. As Keohane and Nye indicate, “If a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others and establish international institutions that encourage others to define their interests in compatible ways, it may not need to expend as many costly traditional economic or military resources [to approach certain diplomatic ends].”⁹ That is the “non-violence” characteristic of cultural diplomacy.

⁸ Milton C. Cummings, Jr. “Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Surve,” (paper presented to the Center for Arts and Culture, 2003): 1, accessed Feb. 1th, 2010, <http://www.culturalpolicy.org/pdf/MCCpaper.pdf>.

⁹ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 1998): 86.

The third common characteristic of cultural diplomacy is its imperceptibility. It is also a common characteristic of culture, as an immaterial being.¹⁰ Hans Morgenthau provides a good description of this trait. He said culture is:

...the most subtle and, if it were ever to succeed by itself alone, the most successful...State A would not need to threaten or employ military force or use economic pressure in order to achieve its ends; for that end, the subservience of State B to its will, would have already been realized by the persuasiveness of a superior cultural and a more attractive political philosophy.¹¹

The imperceptibility of culture provides the imperceptibility of cultural diplomacy. With it, cultural diplomacy may have a two-aspect approach. The first approach is diplomatic form which is difficult to defend since actions do not easily attract the attention of the targets. The second approach is cultural diplomacy which has opportunities to realize long-standing and deep influences when it is imperceptible to target states.

The three characteristics are discussed in many studies. This thesis does not deny the common characteristics of cultural diplomacy and their relationship to the common features of culture. However, does it mean the cultural diplomacies of all states are the same - possibly not? The thesis also intends to show the relationship between culture and cultural diplomacy is far more complex than the aforementioned simple connection.

1.1.2 Research Approach

To comprehensively investigate the differences and similarities between cultural diplomacies of different states and to explore the differences between cultural diplomatic differences and cultural differences, one problem must be solved first. That is, to find an appropriate approach with which to compare cultural diplomacies of different states and

¹⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1954), 57-8.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 57-8.

to reveal the mutual differences between them within their own cultures. Three common approaches, which are extensively applied in the existing studies of cultural diplomacy, may be useful: historical analysis, logic generalization, and comparative study.

Historical analysis is one of the early approaches applied in cultural diplomacy studies.¹²The approach aims to reveal the developing and changing processes of cultural diplomacy and its characteristics by reviewing a state's cultural diplomatic actions within certain historical periods. Historical analysis provides a relatively comprehensive observation of a state's cultural diplomacy evolutionary processes. It is also useful in discovering enduring characteristics (and defects) of the cultural diplomatic practices of a state. This is due to the fact various diplomatic actions, and relevant political, economic, military, and social conditions can be analyzed in a certain time span. In this sense, the changes are easy to find, while the enduring aspects are also easy to observe. Additionally, in some cases, an historical view can take account of all the reasons, processes, and results of certain diplomatic strategies or tactics, and draw a comprehensive understanding of the diplomatic practice. However, for this thesis, an historical analysis may be insufficient. The research focus of this study is on cultural and cultural diplomatic differences between states rather than between different periods of one state. Although an historical analysis may be helpful discover some significant features of the culture and cultural diplomacy of a state, it is difficult to realize a comprehensive comparison between different states. Nor can it distinguish the

¹² For example, all of Ruth McMurry and Muna Lee's *The Cultural Approach* (1947), Philip H. Coombs' *The Fourth Dimension* (1964), and Frank Ninkovich's *The Diplomacy of Ideas* (1981) applied this approach.

characteristics of cultural diplomacy produced by cultural distinction from those produced by other factors.

The second approach is logic generalization.¹³ The strength of the approach is literature analysis, i.e., comparing concrete diplomatic behaviors and the comparisons with abstract descriptions of cultural traits. By employing logic generalization, relations between the characters of cultural diplomacy of a state and the essential traits of the culture of the state can be explored. In terms of this, the approach is a powerful tool with which the thesis is able to test the relationship between culture and cultural diplomacy. Yet, the problem remains that spurious relations are difficult to avoid using this approach. Usually, according to case studies, it is not difficult to build a connection between two variables. However, with a single case, it is difficult to judge whether the built relationship is causal to some extreme or just a spurious correlation. Nor can a single-case study manifest whether certain characteristics may be held by other cases.

In this aspect, the approach of comparative study does not involve this problem due to more than one case being engaged. By case comparison, it is easy to observe similar and different conditions, patterns, processes, and results between cultural diplomacies of different states. By comparing and contrasting, it is also possible to filter effective variables. Additionally, by employing a multi-aspect comparison, the study can investigate more than one possible factor which may influence certain phenomena or characteristics. In light of these advantages, the comparative study is applied as the main approach in this thesis. Nevertheless, two problems must be solved in order to attain full

¹³ E.g., Alastair Johnston and J.M. Mitchell applied this approach in their studies. See Alastair Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, cop. 1995), and Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations* (London; Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986).

use of the comparative approach. Firstly, a specific comparative framework must be established for this research. It should provide a clear and comprehensive definition of the concept of cultural diplomacy; for the purpose of this particular research, it should also be able to offer an appropriate delimitation of comparison aspects in order to maximize the specificity and depth of the study. Secondly, a careful selection of cases is also important. Although the number of cases in any study is limited, the characters of the chosen cases do relate directly to the comprehensiveness and depth of the research. An appropriate case selection is helpful with respect to realizing high-qualified case comparisons. Hence, two significant initial tasks of the thesis are the construction of a comparative framework and the selection of cases.

1.2 Research Design

1.2.1 Research Procedure

Based on a comparative study, this thesis intends to examine, in two steps, the relations between cultural diplomatic differences and cultural differences. First, the study will construct a theoretical framework, specific to the comparison of cultural diplomacies of two states. It includes discussions regarding the definition of cultural diplomacy, the conditions and aspects of the states' cultural diplomacy, and comparative diplomatic procedures.

The second step is a study of Canadian and Chinese cultural diplomacies. Four aspects will be investigated, namely, "institutional setting," "cultural strategy," "practical process," and "phasic result"¹⁴. By comparison, this thesis attempts to seek the relations between the differences of the two states' cultural diplomacies with respect to the

¹⁴ "Phasic result" refers to the potential effect of cultural diplomatic practices, which can be observed so far. It may not be the final effect or represents the end of the practices.

aforementioned four aspects, and their cultural differences. Two steps are also designed to perceive the relations. First, the differences between the cultural diplomacies of two states are sought. Second, congenialities among the differences within certain cultural distinctions, of either case, are analyzed. Logic generalization may also be utilized to explore and interpret such relations.

1.2.2 Thesis Statements

- A) Cultural diplomacies, based on different cultures, share some characteristics in certain aspects, such as the basic pursuits involved in cultural strategy.
- B) Cultural diplomacies in different cultures have obvious divergences, such as different cultural strategic contents, different institutional settings, different preferred practical means, etc. The majority of the differences relate to cultural differences of the states.
- C) Non-cultural factors also display influences upon cultural diplomatic practices. In some cases, the relation of cultural diplomatic practices may be somewhat closer to non-cultural factors than to cultural factors.

1.3 Literature Review: Existing Studies Regarding Cultural Diplomacy

While records in early 1883 discussed applying cultural tools to official diplomacy, the term “cultural diplomacy” did not appear until 1934.¹⁵ Only after World War II did specific research regarding cultural diplomacy gradually become popular and theoretical. Some representative works in this early period were Ruth McMurry and Muna Lee’s *The Cultural Approach: Another Way in International Relations* (1947) and

¹⁵ See Nelly Childress, “Notes from Alliance’s Documents at the Historical Society going back to 1903,” accessed Feb. 18th, 2010, <http://www.afphila.com/history>; Ben M. Cherrington, “The Diversion of Cultural Relations,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* vol. 3 (1939): 136; and Richard F. Pattee, “The Division of Cultural Relations and the Rôle of Modern Language Teachers in the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations,” *The Modern Language Journal* vol. 23, No. 7 (1939): 483.

Philip H. Coombs' *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs* (1964).¹⁶ In 1981, Frank Ninkovich published a landmark work of cultural diplomacy study, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. foreign policy and cultural relations, 1938-1950*. This work, for the first time, generalized the experiences of America's cultural diplomacy during the mid 20th century.¹⁷ In the book, Ninkovich also revealed the general applicability of cultural diplomacy within the entire modern diplomacy rather than only for special powers such as the U.S.¹⁸ In his 1996 book, Ninkovich reinforced this point from an institutional angle.¹⁹ Additionally, he highlighted that an inefficient setting of the governmental departments of culture and information affairs might seriously affect the outcomes of cultural diplomatic practice and the ultimate realization of the state's cultural strategy.²⁰

In the same period, another significant work of cultural diplomacy study was also published. In 1986, J. M. Mitchell, a British diplomat, published his book, *International Cultural Relations*. Differing from Ninkovich's historical studies, Mitchell introduced more methodologies regarding theoretical analysis and case study to cultural diplomacy research. In this sense, cultural diplomacy study was, for the first time, systematized. In this work, Mitchell carefully defined the concept "cultural diplomacy," and discussed origins, development, history of relevant government institutions for cultural diplomacy,

¹⁶ See Ruth McMurry and Muna Lee, *The Cultural Approach*; and Philip H. Coombs, *The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs* (book published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Row, New York, 1964).

¹⁷ See Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 8-34, 61-86, and 113-138.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 5, 72, 168-72.

¹⁹ See Frank A. Ninkovich, *U.S. Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1996).

²⁰ Cf. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, 1-2, and Ninkovich, *U.S. Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy*, 71-3.

and aims and measures of cultural diplomacy.²¹ Furthermore, Mitchell introduced a worldwide view into cultural diplomatic study. His *International Cultural Relations* covers the analyses of cultural diplomacies of various types of power in the contemporary world, such as the United Kingdom (U.K.), the United States (U.S.), Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany, and Japan.²² Unfortunately, in spite of the multi-case analysis, their comparisons were not adequate. More foci were placed on the elaboration of every single case rather than case comparison. Nevertheless, the achievements in systematizing the research area and expanding the research view have launched the book as a milestone in the history of cultural diplomacy research.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, particularly after the events of 9/11 in the U.S., the study of cultural diplomacy underwent its second upsurge.²³ The studied area was expanded to both theoretical and historical levels. The most striking illustration of theoretical research in this period involved a series of studies by the Centre of Arts and Culture of the U.S. At the end of World War II, the Centre started a specific program named, “Art, Culture and National Agenda” to evaluate American cultural policies. Five research reports were published through this program up until 2003, which collected volumes of studies concerning almost all the main aspects of America’s cultural diplomatic policies.²⁴ In historical research, Richard T. Arndt moved cultural diplomacy

²¹ J.M. Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations*, 2-11, 26-7, 64-5, 56-7, 71, 85.

²² *Ibid.*, 16, 35-48, 24-5, 69, 231-40.

²³ To a large extent, it is because people’s unprecedented enthusiasm and attention on how to make an effective cultural communication with Islamic world.

²⁴ See Cummings, “Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government,” Cynthia P. Schneider, “Diplomacy That Works: ‘Best Practices’ in Cultural Diplomacy,” *Center for Arts and Culture* (2003); Margaret J. Wyszomirski, “International Cultural Relations: A Multi-Country Comparison,” *Center for Arts and Culture* (2003), András Szántó, “A New Mandate For Philanthropy? U.S. Foundation Support for International Arts Exchanges,” *Center for Arts and Culture* (2003), and Juliet Sablosky, “Recent Trends in Department of State Support for Cultural Diplomacy: 1993-2002,” *Center for Arts and Culture* (2003).

research forward in 2005. His work, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, is regarded as the most complete summary of cultural diplomacy history of the U.S. Instead of the conventional policy-focus in historical studies of the past, this book focuses on a bilateral process of cultural diplomacy, “a complex and balanced give-and-take.”²⁵ Over and above the theoretical and historical studies, a fair number of case studies regarding new features and trends of cultural diplomacy, in various countries, also emerged, which contributed to the interpretations of cultural diplomatic processes and measures based upon certain cultural characteristics in globalization.²⁶

In summary, studies so far have covered the basic elements and aspects of cultural diplomacy, such as the definition of the concept, conditions and restrictions as to the application of cultural diplomacy, and the features of different states’ cultural diplomacy. Nevertheless, in these studies, the difference in cultural diplomacy between states has not, as yet, been a primary concern. Nor has the influence of cultural differences been paid special attention. Thus, in order to fill the gap, this research proposes an in-depth investigation into the differences of cultural diplomacies of different states and cultures, and furthermore, explores the relations between culture differences and cultural diplomatic differences.

²⁵ Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings*, 3.

²⁶ See, for example, Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), Louis Belanger, “Redefining Cultural Diplomacy: Cultural Security and Foreign Policy in Canada,” *Political Psychology* vol. 20, No. 4 (1999):677-99, and Ana Filipa Teles, “Portugal and Cultural Diplomacy,” accessed Feb. 4th, 2010, <http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/pdf/case-studies/portugal-and-cd.pdf>.

1.4 Overview of the Chapters

Seven chapters are presented in this thesis. Chapter 1 is the Introduction. Chapter 2 reviews the main existing studies regarding the effects of culture on diplomacy and international relations. It includes an analysis of three theories that interpret the principles of cultural influence in a state's diplomatic actions, and four theories which discuss the impacts of culture on international relations and the world-wide power distribution. Some perspectives of the analyzed theories help to construct the basic theoretical framework of this thesis. Discussions as to the defects of the existing theories also assist in clarifying aspects to which this thesis will make a contribution.

Chapter 3 constructs a specific framework for the comparative case studies involving the relationship between cultural differences and cultural diplomatic differences. To begin with, a combined definition of the concept "cultural diplomacy", with an understanding of several levels, is given. Herein, as the first part of the framework, the thesis fully discusses the senders, the receivers, active areas, behavioral purposes, and behavioral characters of cultural diplomacy at different levels. The investigative scope of the thesis is also set. The second part of the framework assesses the conditions of cultural diplomacy. It intends to clarify the main aspects involved in the comparative study of the thesis. The third part of the framework is a brief interpretation of the choice of cases and the procedures of the case studies and comparisons.

Chapter 4 provides a case study of Canadian cultural diplomacy, including analyses of its cultural strategies, basic conditions with which to apply cultural diplomacy, institutional settings, behavioral characteristics, and phasic results of the diplomatic practices. The investigation covers the overall development of Canadian cultural

diplomacy from the 1950s to the present, while recent cultural diplomacy (i.e. from 1990s to 2009) is specifically examined. Chapter 5 analyzes the cultural diplomacy of China in the same period of time and in the same way.

Based on the case studies, Chapter 6 gives a comparative study between Canadian and Chinese cultural diplomacies. The comparative study includes comparisons of institutional settings, cultural strategies, practical situations, and the phasic results of two cases. During the comparison, the study also attempts to seek the relationship between the cultural diplomatic differences of Canada and China and their cultural differences.

Chapter 7 draws the entire study to a conclusion. The thesis attempts to show there are various differences between states' cultural diplomacies, and some differences may relate to the cultural differences of the states, but not all. Additionally, the potential influence of many non-cultural factors is discussed. Chapter 7 also includes a discussion and the implications of this study on cultural diplomatic research and practice.

CHAPTER 2

CULTURE WITHIN DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Culture usually plays as an important role in historical and modern times of human communication, both domestically and internationally.²⁷ Many studies are devoted to exploring the influences of culture on human societies, and their interactions. In terms of the extent and purpose of the study, the thesis intends to discuss eight theories which specifically focus on the roles of culture in diplomacy and international relations, and which also represent some archetypical characteristics of existing cultural diplomacy and international cultural relation studies. They provide some basic perspectives that may support the following construction of the comparative framework in the thesis. On the other hand, they also show a pervasive inadequacy of existing studies in understanding cultural differences and their potential influences on the international actions of states, such as cultural diplomatic practices.

2.1 Culture in Diplomacy

To investigate understanding of the role of culture on a state's diplomatic practice, this thesis discusses four theories, namely, "soft power" theory, cultural internationalism theory, cultural imperialism theory, and social constructivism theory.

"Soft power" theory was raised and developed in the 20th century. The concept of "soft power" was initially constructed based upon the works of Hans J. Morgenthau,

²⁷ Harvey B. Feigenbaum, "Globalization and Cultural Diplomacy" (paper published as Art, Culture & the National Agenda Issue Paper, Jan, 2002): 10.

Klaus Knorr and Ray Cline.²⁸ At the end of the 20th century, Joseph Nye Jr. provided a clear and systematic interpretation of the theory. Nye defines two types of power. The first is “hard power,” which is a power yielded from “military and economic might”; the second is “soft power,” the might “without tangible threats or payoffs,” which is usually derived from the culture and foreign communication capacities of a state.²⁹ Nye argues that soft power is distinctive from other powers, since it uniquely has “the ability to shape the preferences of others.”³⁰ This is an area into which “hard power” has difficulty reaching. As for the source of “soft power,” Nye states it stems largely from the distractive cultural characteristics of a state (“in place where it is attractive to others”); cultural characteristics at a sociological level may not impact the actions of a state directly but via their political expressions, “political values.”³¹ In particular, it refers to the self-identity and preference of the state in political affairs “at home and abroad,” which represent the “legitimate and moral authority” of the values.³² Via special cultural policies and practices, the state attempts to spread the legitimate and moral authority of the values to other states, and further change the identities and preference of these states.³³ This is the whole process of cultural influence on a state action, in particular foreign actions, according to Nye. This process indicates that not only the resource but also the means is special for culture to impact the state’s foreign actions. In other words, cultural influences upon the state are expressed via special political expressions.³⁴

²⁸ Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power,’” *Survival* (2010): 17.

²⁹ Nye, *Soft Power*, 5.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

³² *Ibid.*, 11.

³³ *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁴ Such as special institutional settings of diplomacy, cultural strategy and policies, and preferred means of diplomatic practices, and so on.

Besides the special means of cultural influence, Nye also argues three distinctive effects of “soft power”: firstly, “it may not need to expend as many costly traditional economic or military resources.”³⁵ Secondly, cultural means can yield long-standing and deep influences on target states. Thirdly, cultural measures are usually far more easily accepted by the targets. Soft power is prone to “achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion.” “Attraction” can influence other states to consider behavioral changes as steered by their states’ own wills, although their wills may have been previously impacted by the soft powers of other states rather than the result of surrendering external pressures. Changes are made based upon the target states’ own decision rather than being coerced. Thus, non-coercive soft power appears less aggressive, and therefore, its influences are accepted more easily by the target states.³⁶ However, Nye argues there are special limitations for soft power. For example, a short-term effect may not be expected. The effects of cultural tools may also be restricted by material conditions, and so on³⁷ which means non-cultural factors may also impact the cultural means of a state.³⁸

In general, the “soft power” theory highlights the distinctive functions and characters of culture as a diplomatic means. Comparatively, the cultural internationalism theory and cultural imperialism theory may try to emphasize the common nature of cultural diplomacy in other diplomatic forms. Ostensibly, the two theories seem antithetical, but they may explain the same essence from two perspectives.

³⁵ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 1998): 86.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 86.

³⁷ Nye, “Think Again: Soft Power.”

³⁸ The point provides a sketchy understanding of the relationship between culture and cultural diplomatic action, but in a definite direction. Nevertheless, the understanding may not be adequate. It only notices the superficial fact that non-cultural factors may limit the cultural diplomacy. But about in what aspects they make influence, and how they make influence, the “soft power” theory may not provide definite interpretations.

Around the same time Nye posted his “soft power” theory, Akira Iriye constructed the “cultural internationalism” theory. The theme of the theory is that “A genuine cultural universalism is possible outside the context of liberal political and economic institutions.”³⁹ This “universalism” is rooted in the expectations of participators in order to gain benefits through cooperation based upon a congruous cultural foundation, and will finally lead to a global cultural transformation, “[an] attempt to build cultural understanding, cooperation, and a sense of shared values across national borders.”⁴⁰ Cultural diplomacy plays an instrumental role in realizing this transformation and further reaching a general “friendly and harmonious” relationship among states.⁴¹ Although the theory does not intend to deny the validity of cultural diversity, it emphasizes the integral harmony of an international society requires a congruous “cultural foundation,” a series of “shared concerns.”⁴²

In light of this potentially global transformation, Hans J. Morgenthau’s cultural imperialism theory may also provide an interpretation, but more from a power relation perspective than a global view. Morgenthau recognizes that the essence of foreign cultural policies is the spread of special values and the constructions of common culture.⁴³ However, in his opinion, the political actions do not stem from the expectation of cooperation but from the power pursuit of practitioners. In the end, the actions may not

³⁹ Francis Fukuyama, Review of *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* by Akira Iriye, *Foreign Affairs* (Nov/Dec 1997), accessed Feb 4th, 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/53410/francis-fukuyama/cultural-internationalism-and-world-order>.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ted Hopf, “Review of *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, by Akira Iriye,” *The American Political Science Review* vol. 93, No. 3 (1999): 752.

⁴² Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 175-6.

⁴³ See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1967), 72.

come to realize a harmonious international relationship among states, but “[a] conquest and control of the minds of men” of a practitioner state on the target state.⁴⁴ Hence, according to cultural imperialism theory, “global harmony” of cultural internationalism is possible, but the price may be the loss of cultural independence of all powerless states in cultural interactions.⁴⁵ Ultimately, international relations will be “harmonious,” since the practitioner states have gained a “complete victory” so that “[any] other method of imperialism [is] superfluous.”⁴⁶

Nevertheless, cultural internationalism and cultural imperialism provide different descriptions of the endpoints of international cultural transformations (“harmonious international relations” or “a complete conquest and control”). They may uncover a similar process—from mutual discrepancy and independence of cultures of states to sharing some values and cultural elements among them. Considering both theories, there are two prior roles in this process. One is the practitioner of cultural foreign actions, i.e., the supplier of the “shared concerns” in the cultural internationalism theory or the cultural imperialist in cultural imperialism theory. The other is the target of the actions, i.e., the sharer of the common culture in the cultural internationalism theory or the victim of cultural intrusions in cultural imperialism theory. However, the two theories do not appear to set special conditions to identify the two roles, i.e., what type of states would be the “practitioner” or the “target” in international cultural interactions. Hence, the thesis argues that, in different occasions, a state may play different roles. In light of this, it is possible for a state to be either the practitioner or the target. One can argue a state may

⁴⁴ Ibid., 55-6.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 57.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 57.

have two basic pursuits in international cultural interactions—preventing intrusion of foreign cultural forces and spreading one’s own culture. As for whether all states have these pursuits, neither theory provides a definite answer. This thesis attempts to shed light on this quandary.

The last theory discussed in this section is social constructivism theory. Distinguished from the three aforementioned theories which treat culture more as an instrument, social constructivism theory attempts to show culture is more than a tool or intermediary, but a nature of interactions and relations among states. The representative scholar of this theory, Alexander Wendt, argues both the international structure and the relations among the agents within it can be regarded as a product of mutual construction of ideas, values, and other cultural elements among states.⁴⁷ Following this logic, cultural changes are bound to cause changes in actions of states and then international relations. That means the cultural characteristics of a state may significantly impact its diplomatic actions and pursuits.⁴⁸ This perspective suggests the extensive potential impact of culture on state’s external actions. In light of this, social constructivism theory offers an interpretation of cultural diplomatic practices along with other diplomatic practices of a state that they may be fundamentally culture-oriented. In this case, also keeping in mind internationalism/imperialism theory, there is a wonder that if the three theories reveal a partial reality of the effect of culture in the actions of a state and its international relations. Is it possible “the common pursuits” and “the culture” influence the actions of a state (such as its cultural diplomacy)? If so, the influences of which factors are more

⁴⁷ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 165, 249.

⁴⁸ This thesis assumes a state’s diplomacy is the behaviors applied for special goals according to special conditions of international relations and pursuits.

significant? The theories may not answer all the questions, but this thesis intends to thoroughly investigate all aspects.

2.2 Culture in International Relations

Apart from cultural theories in diplomacy, there are studies regarding cultural influences with respect to international power distribution and international relations. These studies pay more attention to the formulations, characteristics, and principles of the current multicultural status of an international cultural structure. Most give estimations of the trend of international cultural distribution, and its relations to international power distribution.

Four pertinent theories represent four archetypal perspectives in present day international political studies concerning cultural influence on international relations (such as a state's identification, the nature of conflicts among states with different cultures, and the developmental tendency of international relations).⁴⁹ The first theory is Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilization" (civilizational clash theory). It argues that cultural differences cause different cultural self-identifications of states.⁵⁰ Based on self-identification, a state formulates different alliances, both culturally and politically.⁵¹ Positional differences between members exist within the alliances, i.e., the "core states" and ordinary members.⁵² Within any particular alliance, the core states are usually the most powerful actors, not only materially but also culturally.⁵³ They are the leaders of their own cultural regions. The root of conflicts in international relations is attributed to

⁴⁹ Hirano Kenichiro, "Theory of International Culture," *Sociological Study Abroad* vol. 2 (1997): 46.

⁵⁰ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 45-48.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 46-7.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 156.

hostilities between cultures and their core states.⁵⁴ In many cases, it is viewed as inevitable and irreconcilable.⁵⁵ The various cultural and political pursuits among cultural alliances are also regarded as the essential reason for the multicultural structure of the contemporary world.⁵⁶

Despite the debates and criticisms of civilizational clash theory,⁵⁷ it does contribute to this thesis. Firstly, the theory offers a “differences→conflicts” pattern where differences in cultures impact the external actions and relations of one state towards another. Although the pattern appears simplistic, it provides a possible interpretation of the relations between a state’s culture and action.

Secondly, the theory addresses several important aspects of the relationship between cultural differences and cultural diplomatic differences. Although the explanations as to aspects within civilizational theory may be inadequate, it is this insufficiency that merits further study. For instance, the civilizational clash theory underscores the impact of cultural differences, which is usually overlooked in existing cultural diplomacy studies. Unfortunately, it goes to the other extreme. All phenomena in international relations are attributed to cultural difference. The influences of other factors are underestimated. The expressive processes of cultural influence are also simplified to a “let there be effect, and there was effect” pattern. This undermines the effect of the theory in revealing the relationship between channel difference of cultural diplomacy and cultural difference. Moreover, in the theory a comparative view is not applied, although

⁵⁴ Ibid., 34.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 42.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 318.

⁵⁷ E.g., David Gress, “The Subtext of Huntington’s ‘Clash’,” *Orbis* (1997): 285-299; and Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006).

eight civilizational regions are listed.⁵⁸ This may have something to do with the author's purpose in writing. It could also be the theory is difficult to effectively interpret as to the relationship between the culture and action of a state, at a general level.⁵⁹

Thirdly, the analysis of civilizational clash theory assists in understanding other theories (e.g., civilizational coexistence theory, cultural friction theory, and "the end of history" theory), since they are either a specific response to civilizational clash theory, or they share a few focusing aspects, although many theories came about earlier than the clash theory, such as "the end of history" theory. By using civilizational clash theory as a comparison, it is easy to become aware of general understandings of the main perspectives and characters of these theories.

Harald Müller's "civilizational coexistence" theory provides directly opposing perspectives to clash theory, which Müller clarified as one of his main purposes of writing.⁶⁰ Although agreeing with Huntington's perspective on the international cultural structure as a multicultural status, Müller argues diversity of culture does not inevitably lead to conflicts. Instead, a harmonious coexistence of various cultures is highly possible.⁶¹ Additionally, Müller attempts to read the "real implication" of Huntington's simple pattern of cultural impacts on international relations.⁶² He argues the perspective of inevitable clashes among civilizations does not stem from the nature of cultural differences, but from the over apprehension of emerging powers and the

⁵⁸ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 45-8.

⁵⁹ Cheng Tongshun, and Hu Yue, "Cultural Props of Foreign Policy," *Tribune of Study* vol. 26 (2010): 34-5.

⁶⁰ Harald Müller, *Das Zusammenleben der Kulturen: Ein Gegenentwurf zu Huntington*, trans. Li Hong and Na Bin (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2002), 1.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 251.

oversimplification of the reason for international conflicts.⁶³ Hence, based on these criticisms of civilizational clash theory, Müller highlights the complexity of international affairs, and the positive impact of cultural differences upon international cooperation.⁶⁴

Also, Hirano Kenichiro's cultural friction theory partially responds to civilizational clash theory.⁶⁵ On the one hand, cultural friction theory agrees with the perspective of multicultural structure and that cultural differences may cause international conflicts in civilizational clash theory.⁶⁶ On the other hand, Kenichiro does not clearly support either trend given by the clash and coexistent theories. Instead, he applied a microscopic view in order to observe culture and its influences upon the foreign actions of a state.⁶⁷ He argues "Cultural friction" refers to "misunderstandings, prejudices, entanglements, and contradictions caused by cultural differences."⁶⁸ It may occur between individuals, communities, or states. However, they are essentially the frictions of individuals.⁶⁹ Furthermore, Kenichiro anticipates these frictions can be reduced by governments with "proper actions and communications," i.e., minimizing misunderstandings by deepening recognition of each other's cultures and accumulating communications and cooperation experiences.⁷⁰

Francis Fukuyama provides another understanding of the effect of culture on international relations, which is different from the three aforementioned understandings. He treats cultural diversity as an interim, and "democracy" is the ultimate end of all

⁶³ Ibid., 23-8.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 298.

⁶⁵ Hirano Kenichiro, "Theory of International Culture," *Sociological Study Abroad* vol. 2 (1997): 46.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 46-7.

⁶⁷ Li Tingjiang, "A New View to Explore International Relations: Hirano Kenichiro and His International Cultural Theory," *Sociological Study Abroad* vol. 2 (1997): 94.

⁶⁸ Kenichiro, "Theory of International Culture," 48.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 4i.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 48-9.

societies. Fukuyama argues, “Culture—in the form of resistance to the transformation of certain traditional values to those of democracy—thus can constitute an obstacle to democratization.”⁷¹ Hence, what mankind requires (for their common pursuit of democracy according to Fukuyama) is perhaps not a colorful cultural world, but “an idea for a Universal History,” namely, “an attempt to find a meaningful pattern in the overall development of human societies generally.”⁷² He believes the “idea” has been found, i.e., [the] liberal democracy. In short, Fukuyama offers an identical development direction for all human societies, “democratic society,” and a universal cultural form, “democratic culture.”⁷³ And in this case, the historical process would not “continue indefinitely,” but would end with a “free society” form.⁷⁴ This is what Fukuyama called the “end of history.”⁷⁵ It also points to an end point of “mankind's ideological evolution and [to] the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”⁷⁶

The previous four theories offer four patterns with which to explain how culture can impact the interactions of states. However, as to exactly how cultural difference works, none of theories provides a sufficient interpretation. Additionally, the latter three theories suffer similar academic inadequacies as does the civilizational clash theory. For instance, both the civilizational coexistence theory and the “end of history” theory lack a comprehensively comparative view as with the clash theory. They also apply relatively macroscopic views in which the influence processes of culture are largely overlooked.

⁷¹ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992), 215.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 55.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 219.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 64.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 64.

⁷⁶ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *The National Interest* (1989), accessed Dec. 14th, 2010, <http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm#source>.

Despite a microscopic perspective of cultural friction theory, treating individuals as the main undertaker of cultural difference may not be the best way to explain states' cultural diplomatic practices. However, one point is clear in the analyses of the four theories (and also the three perspectives of cultural effect in cultural diplomacy). The impact of culture on state is complex. Perhaps, only with a special and in-depth study of the relationship of culture and action on a state, can a more comprehensive understanding be achieved

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH INTO RELATIONS BETWEEN CULTURAL DIFFERENCE AND CULTURAL DIPLOMATIC DIFFERENCE

The research on relations between cultural difference and cultural diplomatic difference will be conducted in three steps. First, it will discuss the definition of cultural diplomacy, and clarify the research scope. Second, it will discuss the conditions of cultural diplomacy, which aims to make preparations for the case selection and comparative process. Third, it will select two cases for the comparison and make a brief description of the comparison process.

3.1 The Dual-level Definition of “Cultural Diplomacy”

“Cultural diplomacy” is a broad and flexible concept. Almost all diplomatic practices related to cultural elements can be placed in this category. On the other hand, for diverse research purposes, scholars usually highlight certain aspects or characters of the diplomatic form in their definitions of “cultural diplomacy.” This is also the case in this thesis. The study mainly investigates the relationship between two variables, i.e., cultural difference and cultural diplomatic difference. Hence, the definition tries to underline the distinctiveness of the diplomatic form in order to underscoring differences of the diplomatic practices and their relations to culture. Meanwhile, the generality of the definition is also considered. The definition aims to cover most cultural diplomatic patterns rather than only several types of cultural diplomatic practices.

According to the existing studies, there are three approaches to define “cultural diplomacy.” Yet, none may satisfy the needs of the study in this thesis. The first type is instrumental definitions. In this definition, the instrumental function of cultural

diplomacy is underscored.⁷⁷ The purpose of applying the instrument is also usually clear, such as “for the achievement of social and economic (and by extension political) objectives in other countries.”⁷⁸ However, the definition does not offer much interpretation on the inner discrepancies of cultural diplomacy, but which is what this thesis intends to focus on. The second type of definition is teleonomic definition. It expresses the “teleonomic” implication of cultural diplomacy - diplomatic actions are treated as the ultimate goal rather than a means or a channel. In other words, the end of diplomatic actions is the actions themselves.⁷⁹ The inner curiosities of mankind about the different cultures and life styles are the essential motivation of the cultural diplomatic practices.⁸⁰ Therefore, in this definition, the non-cultural-purpose diplomatic practices are not considered, while both the difference of cultural diplomacy and their relations to cultural difference may relate to the non-cultural factor and be shown in non-cultural-purpose diplomatic practices. In this case, this definition does not fairly fit the thesis. The third is auxiliary definition. This definition pays more attention to the subordinate position of cultural diplomacy to economic and political diplomacies.⁸¹ In the definition, both the functions and the relationship of cultural diplomacy, with other diplomatic forms and ends, are the foci. The definition also takes note of the inner differences on a level of diplomatic practice. However, the distinctiveness of cultural diplomacy is underestimated,

⁷⁷ Refer to Ninkovich’s definition of “cultural diplomacy” in *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, 48.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 65-6.

⁷⁹ Refer to Hirano Kenichiro, “Theory of International Culture,” *Sociological Study Abroad* vol. 2 (1997): 43-5.

⁸⁰ Refer to Arndt’s definition of “cultural diplomacy,” *The First Resort of Kings*, 3, and Milton Cummings’ definition in “Cultural Diplomacy and United States Government,” 1.

⁸¹ See Mao Tse-tung, “Talks at the Yen-an Forum on Literature and Art,” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Volume III, ed. Committee for the Publication of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 86.

because of the emphasis of the subordinate position and auxiliary function, while it is the key aspect of this thesis.

Hence, based upon the research ends of the thesis, the study adopts a dual-level definition of “cultural diplomacy,” which underlines both the external and internal characters of the diplomatic form.

In this definition, “cultural diplomacy” generally refers to *the nonviolent foreign actions by or for cultural protections, disseminations, and exchanges*. Yet, there are two levels in “cultural diplomacy.” At the basic level, cultural diplomacy only points to the cultural practices of departments or other agencies of the central government of a state for special strategic purposes, i.e., “official cultural diplomacy of the nation.” At a broader level, the definition covers a larger variety of activities. All foreign actions, related to culture by official or unofficial agencies, central governments, provincial governments, or non-governmental organizations, with respect to a national group or individual purposes, are included. In this thesis, the study is basically focused on official cultural diplomacies due to data limitations, methodology, and other aspects. Yet, if necessary, with regard to some aspects of the study, diplomatic actions may also be examined at a broader level.

3.2 The Conditions of Cultural Diplomacy

The condition of diplomatic practices is another important aspect of cultural diplomacy studies. The process of cultural diplomatic practices is usually complex, where various conditions may work. This thesis focuses on three basic conditions of cultural diplomacy, i.e., cultural resource, institutional setting of cultural diplomacy, and cultural strategy, as they pertain to the study of general characteristics of cultural diplomacy of a state and its relations to its culture.

3.2.1 Cultural Resource

“Cultural resource” refers to the material basis of a state which can be distributed and utilized in cultural diplomacy processes. It includes basic national resources such as a state’s territory, population, identity, and the economic, political, and military powers of the state, which are basically the conditions of all diplomatic practices. Apart from the above mentioned resources, cultural resources, such as the cultural system of a state (language, ideas, customs, norm, and other national characters), cultural works (music, fine arts, movies, and so on), cultural symbols and landscape, the strength of cultural production, etc., also include materials that can support the state’s cultural power, etc. Generally a state’s various cultural resources can be placed into four categories, i.e., material, institutional, behavioral, and spiritual cultural resources. “Material resources,” such as population, territory, socioeconomic level, technological level, distinctive cultural products, and various natural and human landscapes and tourist resources, are the tangible portion of a state’s available resources. “Institutional resources” refer to the institutions a state is able to utilize in order to practice cultural diplomacy. Internally, it has to do with the perfection of a state’s domestic cultural institutions and their outpost agencies, together with the participating status and influence of a state in global and regional international organizations. “Behavioral resource” involves the unique national behaviors of a state, including, for example, national customs, ceremonies, and festivals. They often yield special cultural symbols, such as the Chinese people’s spring festival customs, American and European states’ Christmas and Halloween customs, and bullfights in Spain, to distinguish a state’s culture from other cultures. “Spiritual culture”

points to crystallizations of human spirit labors, such as distinctive philosophies, religions, ideologies, and national spirits, etc., in given cultural regions.

3.2.2 Institutional Setting of Cultural Diplomacy

“Cultural institutions” are the behavior agents for a state of cultural diplomacy. Not only are they the undertakers of cultural strategy, but they are also the concrete practitioners of a state’s cultural diplomatic policies. According to the definition of cultural diplomacy, “cultural institutions” contain special governmental and non-governmental cultural institutions, the non-special agencies in charge of cultural affairs, the national and private profitable or unprofitable organizations engaged in cultural production, and other communities or individuals carrying on various cultural activities.

This thesis focuses more on governmental segments within various institutions, i.e., the departments in charge of cultural diplomatic affairs, formulated and managed by the central government of a state. They can be roughly put into two categories, the central decision-leading sections and outpost sections. The central institutions are usually responsible for the design and management of cultural diplomatic actions, and publishing foreign cultural policies. They are also one of the main managers and distributors of a state’s cultural resources and cultural production. The outpost agencies are usually the direct practitioners of a state’s foreign policies. They could be the state’s embassies or consulates and are secondary organs, diplomatic or economic missions, or governmental officers and other deputies with cultural diplomatic missions. A state’s cultural diplomatic institutions may not contain both permanently central and outpost sections. Also, the central sections in a state may not be one department.

3.2.3 Cultural Strategy

Cultural strategy is a state's grand plan for cultural diplomacy. Usually, every state applies cultural diplomacies according to its cultural strategy. A cultural strategy includes the basic goals, practical objectives, and procedures of a state's cultural diplomacy.⁸² Three concepts are usually referred to in the cultural strategy of states, namely, "national image," "cultural security," and "economic and political benefits."

National image is deemed "the projection abroad of a nation."⁸³ Although a state's national image may be intangible and difficult to measure, it usually plays a crucial role in the cultural strategy of the state, "because the maneuverability and influence of countries in the world community is affected by their image, cultural exports are 'extremely' profitable, and because trade penetration abroad depends on the image."⁸⁴ A positive national image can reduce costs to a state as far as its foreign affairs and enhance supports to the state of the international society.⁸⁵

Security is one of the basic pursuits of a state in international society.⁸⁶ Cultural security is a significant part of a state's international security.⁸⁷ The national cultural security of a state can be understood from two perspectives. The constructivist angle is a country's pursuit of security with which to partially produce its own identity, and its

⁸² Nye, *Soft Power*, 107-17.

⁸³ Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration* (London: Routledge, 1995), 127.

⁸⁴ John Saul, "Culture and Foreign Policy," in *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future: Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy*, Jean Gauthier, et al. (Ottawa: The Committee, 1994), 85.

⁸⁵ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 69; Keohane and Nye, "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age," 86; Nye's *Soft Power*, 12-5.

⁸⁶ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston, Mass. [u.a.]: McGraw-Hill, 2007), 126.

⁸⁷ See Kurt Werner Radtke and Raymond Feddema, Preface to *Comprehensive Security in Asia: Views from Asia and the West on a Changing Security Environment* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), xii.

attitude towards other world members.⁸⁸ A national culture usually constructs a corresponding national security viewpoint as a key part of national interests.⁸⁹ As per diplomatic practice, national culture security serves as the prerequisite of a state with which to sustain an independent identity and a distinctive membership in international society. It has a crucial influence upon the friend/foe identification and concrete tactics of a country's entire security strategy.⁹⁰

The economic and political benefits gained from cultural diplomacy serve as an active motivation for a state to practice cultural diplomacy. It may say that the economic benefit is the most "visible" part of the "invisible" cultural diplomacy and many countries have been aware of the economic value of cultural diplomacies, particularly since the end of the Cold War.⁹¹ The capability of a state's cultural industry to stimulate its national economy is one of the core standards with which to assess the effectiveness of its cultural diplomacy.⁹² Cultural diplomacy also makes sense in resolving regular diplomatic problems. It is usually utilized as a "key" to break diplomatic deadlocks, or as a prologue of the formal diplomatic relationship between former hostile states.

According to cultural international and imperialism theories, different states may share some basic pursuits. In association with the discussion concerning the above noted

⁸⁸ Refer to Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), and Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

⁸⁹ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 93.

⁹⁰ Paola Catenaccio, "Between multiculturalism and globalization: Considerations on language use, identity, and power," 60, accessed Mar. 18th, 2010, <http://www.ledonline.it/mpw/allegati/mpw0303catenaccio.pdf>.

⁹¹ A. Parsons, "Vultures and Philistines—British Attitudes to Culture and Cultural Diplomacy," *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 61, No. 1 (Winter, 1984-1985): 1, and J. Burgh, "Why Britain Needs Overseas Students," (paper presented at Newcastle University London: British Council, 1984).

⁹² Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations*, 3.

three concepts, this thesis posts the hypothesis that cultural strategy of a state usually contains three basic pursuits, no matter what culture or conditions they are based on. The pursuits are constructing a positive national image, protecting national cultural security, and benefiting from economic and political affairs. This hypothesis will be examined in the later comparative study.

3.3 A Comparative Approach to the Relation Study

Based upon the definition and condition analysis of cultural diplomacy, this thesis constructs a specific comparative study to investigate the relations between cultural difference and cultural diplomatic difference. Two cases, Canada and China are selected in the study.

3.3.1 The Case Choice

The Canadian and Chinese cases are selected due to their representativeness and comparative values. The representativeness refers to the generality of the cases. “General” cases should not be the extreme points of the system, so that the comparison between them is able to represent the situations of other cases in the same pool. The conclusion drawn from the comparison may also have a more general meaning rather than being merely valid to the compared cases. The Canadian case and the Chinese case meet this requirement. Neither is an “extreme” state in international society; they are not superpowers in international society or the peripheral states.⁹³

⁹³ “Peripheral states” refer to states making little sense for the entire international structure.

In modern (especially after World War II) international relations, it became common practice for Canada to refer to itself as “a ‘middle power’ in world affairs.”⁹⁴ As “middle powers,” the states

...cannot be fully involved in everywhere and play with vigour in all arenas of world politics. They can be active in several places, but within limits. They must choose their places and make sure that their activity in one area reinforces their actions in other, rather than waste limited resources by acting at cross purposes. Lacking the capability to go it alone, the middle power must combine with others to make their weight felt. They thus have to compromise their individual preferences, principles, and distinctive values to come to a common, consensus, coalition view. And they continually have to try to constrain the major powers from going it alone, to bind them in a dense web of multilateral processes, institutions, and rules. These middle powers have to work within existing international organizations, rather than transform, abandon, or create alternatives to them, as the best instrument available for constraining the power of the great.⁹⁵

In Canadian diplomatic actions, many “middle power characters” such as following and supporting the propositions and actions of great world powers play a role, especially the U.S. and U.K.⁹⁶ On the other hand, Canada is not a “nobody” when it comes to current international relations. As “more the largest of the small powers than the smallest of the large powers,” Canada’s significance is difficult to overlook, especially in regards to global economy and the development of international regimes.⁹⁷

China is also a significant country but not a superpower in international society. Considering China’s elevating position in the recent two decades, the state has gradually

⁹⁴ Steven Holloway, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest* (Peterborough, Ont.; Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press, 2006), 185.

⁹⁵ John J. Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Australia; Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007), 54.

⁹⁶ Andrew Fenton Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada, 1997), 281-2.

⁹⁷ Bruce Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), 69.

become a “someone” in contemporary international society.⁹⁸ Yet, China is still far from the “top.” In many ways, China is weaker than the truly top-notch world powers. For instance, its socioeconomic indices such as GDP per capita (PPP), average life expectancy, literacy rate, and unemployment rate, are still positioned at a middle level with the entire world.⁹⁹ Less like a manager and leader and more like a latecomer, in most cases, China rises as an emerging world power requiring further development.¹⁰⁰

Another reason for selecting the Canadian case and Chinese case is the fact they have mutually comparative values. The values can be viewed from two perspectives. Firstly, they are comparable. As discussed previously, both states are not extreme cases. Both states actively participate in their regional affairs or in global international affairs. Both countries have rich cultural resources with which to practice cultural diplomacies.

Canada enjoys a vast territory, sufficient water, fuel, mines, and biological resources as basic material resources.¹⁰¹ Canada also has a healthy economic condition. It is a developed country with a solid economic structure, broad economic freedom, and maintains an extensive shared market with the U.S.¹⁰² In the meantime, Canada enjoys a positive external environment with a solid ally and neighbor of a current superpower and is not overly concerned with military or political security. Nor must Canada spend large amounts of money on armament. As far as institutional resources being the main

⁹⁸ CNNMoney.com, “China Marches towards World’s No. 2 Economy,” accessed Dec. 15th, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/2010/08/16/news/international/japan_china/index.htm#TOP.

⁹⁹ Refer to CIA, *The World Factbook 2009* (Washington D.C.: Potomac; Poole: Chris Lloyd, 2009), 14, 136-7; UNDP, *Human Development Report 2009* (New York: Oxford University Press, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 172; and UNDP, *Human Development Indices (2008)*, accessed Mar. 5th, 2010, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDI_2008_EN_Tables.pdf.

¹⁰⁰ Martin Hart-Landsberg and Paul Burkett, “China, Capitalist Accumulation, and Labor,” *Monthly Review* vol. 59, Issue 1 (2007): 19-21.

¹⁰¹ “Wide Screen, Canada’s Diversity on Film,” *Canada World View* (Winter 2003), 16-7.

¹⁰² See relevant data from International Monetary Fund (IMF) web site, accessed Mar. 18th, 2010, <http://imf.org/external/data.htm>.

participator and improver of modern international regimes, and a close ally of the leaders of the regimes, Canada retains many advantages in this area.¹⁰³ So far, Canada is a member of almost all the important international organizations, and some regional organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Canada participates as an initiator and manager in global cultural regimes, especially in international dialogues in the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity of United Nations Education, Science, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the International Network on Cultural Policy (INCP) regarding cultural diversity and international cultural co-operation.¹⁰⁴ The behavioral resources of Canada can be expressed in two sub-categories. The first category has to do with national actions which have been deemed certain features or symbols of Canada. A striking example is sports. Ice sport (e.g., hockey, curling, and skate) is considered one of the most outstanding Canadian symbols. The 2010 Winter Olympic Games, held in Vancouver, and the excellent performances of Canadian athletes successfully showed a “peaceful, friendly, yet diligent, active” image to the world.¹⁰⁵ The second sub-category involves distinctive attitudes or actions of the country at the international level. Canadian international institutionalism is highlighted by its active attitudes and excellent actions which the state gain pervasive supports from the members of the institutions and their observers.¹⁰⁶ Canadian spiritual resources, or “Canadian

¹⁰³ John J. Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Australia; Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2007), 24-5.

¹⁰⁴ ERICarts, *Compendium: Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe* (Country Profile: Canada, Council of Europe/ERICarts, 2008), 9-10.

¹⁰⁵ Refer to the homepage of 2010 Winter Olympic Games, accessed Feb. 28th, 2010, <http://www.olympic.org/vancouver-2010-winter-olympics>.

¹⁰⁶ “Canada matches Haiti donations with \$113M,” CBC News, Feb. 8th, 2010, accessed Mar. 18th, 2010, <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2010/02/08/haiti-donations-matching-relief-oda.html>.

values,” also play a positive role in Canadian cultural diplomacy. Canada holds a very similar value and ideology system to the U.S. and European countries.¹⁰⁷ The main body of Canadian politics and culture is a portion of the dominant policy and culture of the world. Hence, in either political development or ideological issues, Canada seldom has an opinion which differs from dominant Western powers.¹⁰⁸ Thus, the state is rarely censured by the leading world powers of the international society (such as the U.S. and European powers), though, from another perspective, the cultural resemblance causes difficulties for Canada in sustaining its cultural identity and independence.

As a country with a history of having one of the longest civilizations, China also has sufficient cultural resources. As with Canada, China’s material resources are rich—a vast territory, various mines, biological resources, and plenty of natural and human landscapes for tourist. Economically, China has become the second largest economy in the world.¹⁰⁹ The degree of openness and level of technology have continued to elevate. Politically, the governances of central and regional governments are usually effective and efficient, particularly during emergencies such as natural disasters or disease epidemics.¹¹⁰ From an aspect of institutional resource, China is a permanent member of the UNSC and holds veto power. Since 2001, China has been a formal member of the WTO and also has membership in other significant global international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In the area of

¹⁰⁷ Foreign Affairs Canada, *Canada in the World. Foreign Policy Review 1995*, accessed March 18th, 2010, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/menu-en.asp.

¹⁰⁸ Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group, “Canadian Culture in a Global World: New Strategies for Culture and Trade” (paper published on International Trade (SAGIT), February 1999), accessed March 18th, 2010, <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/fo/canculture.aspx?lang=en>.

¹⁰⁹ CNNMoney.com, “China Marches towards World's No. 2 Economy.”

¹¹⁰ Hu Baijing ed., *Report of Crisis Management in China 2008-2009* (Beijing: People’s University Publish House, 2009), 1-3.

culture, China is an active member of UNESCO. In East Asia, China plays a more significant role. It is an initiator, conductor, and important participant in several significant regional organizations such as the Asia-Europe Meeting, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, ASEAN-China, Japan and the Republic of Korea regime (10+3), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. The profound Chinese culture and rich national traditions, offering the state's distinctive behavior, forms the characteristics of their behavior resources. Native foods, customs, and festivals continually identify the Chinese people as an independent and integral cultural as a whole in international society. The brilliant achievements of the Chinese people in sports, art, education, and other areas also enhance the cultural image of the state. In political culture, the continually independent and peaceful diplomatic attitude and active actions to aid states in trouble are welcomed and recognized by many members of the international society.¹¹¹ The "five principles of peaceful coexistence," posed by China, also contribute to the modern diplomatic regime.¹¹² As one of the earliest civilizations, China has established a distinctive and complex philosophic and ethical cultural system. With thousands of years' of cultural and national fusions, many originally independent regional cultures have been gradually fused into the integrity of the "Chinese culture." This not only provides sufficient spiritual resources for the utility of Chinese cultural diplomacy, but offers a strong support to the independent cultural and national identity of the state. Yet, it also yields a seriously different and independent

¹¹¹ Robert Sutter, "Why Does China Matter," *The Washington Quarterly* vol. 7:1 (2004): 87.

¹¹² Willy Wo-Lap Lam, *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 165-8.

culture from the world's present dominant culture (Western culture) that grew from other cultural sources (such as ancient Greek culture, Christian culture, and so on).¹¹³

Although there may be some differences in concrete components, according to Canadian and Chinese cultural resources, in general, both states have sufficient cultural resources for their cultural diplomacy. This provides a comparability of their cultural diplomatic practices. At the same time, the Chinese case and the Canadian cases have obvious discrepancies within their cultures and cultural diplomatic conditions. For instance, Chinese culture and Canadian culture are obviously different cultural systems. Their cultural implications, policies, and actions are also different in many cases. More importantly, Canadian culture is a part of the established cultural discourse in the current international system, but this cultural discourse does not affect Chinese culture.

This thesis selects Canada and China as being two cases representing the relationship between cultural differences and cultural diplomatic differences, based on the aforementioned reasons.

3.3.2 The Comparative Study Procedure

The investigation into the relationship between cultural difference and cultural diplomatic difference is based upon the analysis and comparison of two cases, Canada and China. The analysis focuses on the basic pursuits and concrete contents of cultural strategies, the formulation and structure of an official institution of cultural diplomacy, and the practical situations of the diplomacy. The analytical coverage emphasizes cultural diplomatic practices in the 21st century, while earlier policies and practices are also examined while investigating the development processes of cultural diplomacies.

¹¹³ Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese's Soft Power," 28-9.

Based on case analyses, four aspects of two states' cultural diplomacy are respectively compared, which are the institutional setting of cultural diplomacy, cultural strategy, cultural diplomatic practices, and phasic results. This thesis does not take into consideration a situation wherein cultural diplomacy may cause the same results. It is not because this situation is impossible, but because, in such a situation, the impact of culture is difficult to identify or distinguish. Hence, the thesis will not investigate whether similar cultural diplomatic characteristics may be caused by different cultural characteristics. During the comparison, the study attempts to seek the obviously different aspects of the two cases of cultural diplomacies. This thesis argues, if the different cultural diplomatic practices of two states have features in common with their cultural characters, they are considered as having relations between them, and vice versa. Of course, this thesis does not overlook the influences of other relative factors upon cultural diplomatic differences between the two states.

CHAPTER 4

CANADIAN CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Since 1963, cultural diplomacy has been listed as a main task of the Canadian Federal Government's foreign policy.¹¹⁴ In 1995, culture was promulgated as the third pillar of Canadian foreign policy.¹¹⁵ In the past decade, the relevant design and implementation of regimes gradually developed. Cultural diplomacy also became an important means of Canada's diplomacy. This thesis' investigation into Canadian cultural diplomacy consists of four parts. First, the study examines the institutional setting of cultural diplomacy within the Canadian Federal Government. The second part focuses on the basic pursuits and concrete contents of the Canadian cultural strategy. The last two parts consist of the practical process and some results of Canadian cultural diplomacies. Via the case analyses, the study explores the operational situations and characteristics of Canadian cultural diplomatic practices.

4.1 The Institutional Settings of Canadian Cultural Diplomacy

Frankly speaking, there is no specific official institution in the Canadian Federal Government, nor "formal inter-ministerial committees or intergovernmental networks," in charge of cultural diplomacy.¹¹⁶ Issue-oriented and temporary inter-ministerial co-operations take care of most diplomatic affairs in cultural areas. That is, as far as the many diplomatic goals, various relevant governmental departments make a temporary cooperation and are in charge of the diplomatic tasks together with mutually independent

¹¹⁴ Mark, "A Comparative Study," 94.

¹¹⁵ Louis Belanger, "Globalization, Culture, and Foreign Policy: The Failure of the 'Third Pillarization' in Canada," *International Journal of Canadian Studies* vol. 22 (Fall 2000):170.

¹¹⁶ Council of Europe/ERICarts: "Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe," 11th edition, 2010, 7, accessed Mar. 18th, 2010, [http:// www.culturalpolicies.net](http://www.culturalpolicies.net).

institutional identities. The leading sections within the cooperation are not pre-set, but are formed according to the concrete conditions of the cultural issue. There are, however, several active departments within Canadian international cultural affairs but are not specific cultural diplomatic sections. Instead, they are the official institutions for domestic cultural affairs or external trade. Most departments, such as the Department of Canadian Heritage, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), the Department of Justice Canada, Human Resources and Social Development Canada, etc., were founded in the late 19th century and early 20th century.¹¹⁷ Within them, three segments usually act as the initiators or managers of the many cultural activities. They are Canadian Heritage, DFAIT, and the Canada Council for the Arts. This thesis takes a more in-depth look at the first two segments, since “the work of the Canada Council has been domestically focused.”¹¹⁸

Canadian Heritage is in charge of Canada’s domestic and international cultural activities and is one of the most important departments doing considerable work in the field of marketing cultural industries internationally and supporting their development domestically.¹¹⁹ One of its main responsibilities is to deliver cultural programs. By 2009, the Department delivered over sixty programs which include an International Strategic Framework (ISF) program and Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises programs.¹²⁰ In addition, the Department also plays an important role in developing and implementing policies and programs, building partnerships, conducting outreach and communication with traditional and new clients and stakeholders and providing analysis and advice to the

¹¹⁷ ERICarts, *Compendium*, 2, 7.

¹¹⁸ Mark, “A Comparative Study,” 93-4.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 93.

¹²⁰ ERICarts, *Compendium*, 10.

Minister.¹²¹ The Department is comprised of three management levels, i.e., Decision-making committees, Operational Committees chaired by the Deputy Minister or Associated Deputy Minister and Advisory Committees¹²²

DFAIT is in charge of another important aspect of cultural diplomacy, namely, cultural industry and cultural activities in international regimes. The International Cultural Relations Bureau, within DFAIT, is mainly responsible for the cultural diplomatic practices.

Residing in this bureau are two significant sections: the Arts and Cultural Industries Promotion Division, and the Academic Relations Division. The former is mainly in charge of showcasing the Canadian national image, protecting national cultural security, and arranging bilateral cultural exchanges with foreign ministries and cultural groups.¹²³ The latter section focuses more on promoting the international dimension of education to Canadians.¹²⁴ It is also a unique section working with foreign and international organizations such as the Commonwealth, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and UNESCO, as well as attending forums such as the G8.¹²⁵

Generally, there are two characteristics in the institutional structure of Canadian cultural diplomacy. One is the issue-oriented inter-ministerial working model. As mentioned, there is no special institution in charge of cultural diplomatic affairs. Instead,

¹²¹ Ibid., 4.

¹²² The organizational structure of the Department refers to Appendix I.

¹²³ Government of Canada, *Evaluation of Arts Promotion, Arts and Cultural Industries Program, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade* (October 2002), accessed Mar. 19th, 2010 <http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/department/auditreports/evaluation/evalACA02-en.pdf>.

¹²⁴ Mark, "A Comparative Study," 97.

¹²⁵ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Government of Canada, "International Academic Relations - About Us" September 30, 2004, accessed Mar. 19th, 2010, <http://www.international.gc.ca/culture/iear/contacts-en.asp>.

the majority of foreign cultural policies and diplomatic practices are usually realized with the cooperation of relevant governmental departments, within which Canadian Heritage and DFAIT act in the manager's role. The other characteristic is that, in order to pay special attention to the actions of international organizations, Canada sets specific sections in charge of this area.

4.2 Cultural Strategy of Canada

This thesis hypothesizes three basic pursuits in the cultural strategy of a state, i.e., constructing an international image, protecting national cultural security, and benefiting economic/political affairs. It has been observed that all are included in the Canadian cultural strategy.

4.2.1 Construct a National Image of Canada

A clear theme emerges from the national image in the Canadian cultural strategy, which is, "relatively unique to Canada and yet supportive of both international and domestic objectives."¹²⁶ A series of cultural diplomatic policies and actions respond to this principle, especially policies regarding international organizations. A striking example is the promotion of the creation of the *Guidelines for Classic Peacekeeping* in 1956.¹²⁷ The *Guidelines* have since become the basic principles of UN peacekeeping actions. The contemporary Prime Minister of Canada, Lester Pearson, won a Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his efforts in this area.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Robin Higham, "The World Needs More Canada. Canada Needs More Canada," in *Handing down of Culture, Smaller Societies, and Globalization*, ed. Jean-Paul Baillargeon (Ontario: Grubstreet Editions, 2001), 141.

¹²⁷ Holloway, *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 102.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 104.

On the other hand, it is notable that actions in creating and enhancing a supportive national image do not usually act as the main foundation of Canadian cultural diplomatic practices, though the principle is fundamentally a part of its cultural strategy. Attention to relevant diplomatic activities such as peacekeeping has not been significant; as of the beginning of the 21st century, funding has also decreased gradually.¹²⁹

Why does Canada express such characteristics in its cultural diplomacy? Does it have relations with the cultural character of Canada? The answers to these questions will be revealed later in this thesis.

4.2.2 Protecting the National Cultural Security of Canada

Protecting national cultural security is a continually significant task of Canadian cultural diplomacy. It actually relates to the construction of the Canadian national image. To construct and enhance a “relatively unique” national image has been not only a goal of Canadian diplomatic practices, but “a more visibly active role” in protecting and developing the independence of the nation, which is regarded “essential to national sovereignty and national goals.”¹³⁰ The Canadian Federal Government is usually devoted to “preserv[ing] a space for Canadian culture.”¹³¹

Historically, Canada was founded on a multicultural basis, comprised of “disconnected fragments” of culture. Hence, it may be difficult to gain a united national

¹²⁹ WFCM, “Canadian & UN Peacekeeping,” *Peace Build*, accessed Jan. 18th, 2011, www.worldfederalistscanada.org/WFCMnews/documents/peacekeeping.pdf.

¹³⁰ See Louis Belanger, “Redefining Cultural Diplomacy: Cultural Security and Foreign Policy in Canada,” *Political Psychology*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Dec., 1999): 678; Canadian Conference of the Arts, “Ownership by Canadians: To Enrich the Social, Political and Cultural Fabric of Canada,” a discussion paper on the foreign ownership rules in broadcasting (October 2003): 7.

¹³¹ John Herd Thompson, “Canada's Quest for Cultural Sovereignty: Protection, Promotion and Popular Culture,” In *North America without Borders? Integrating Canada, the United States, and Mexico*, ed. Stephen J. Randall, Herman W. Konrad, and Sheldon Silverman (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1992), 269-284.

identity from the historic cultural fusions. Nor does an original culture exist that is able to support the construction of such an identity.¹³² Meanwhile, Canadian culture suffers from both external and internal threats. Externally, the similar cultural background, beliefs, ideas, values, and customs of great cultural powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, make it more difficult for Canada to sustain an independent cultural identity. Continually deepening globalization and internationalism reduce Canada's capacity to defend itself against the various cultural corruptions of these powers.¹³³ That is why many scholars argue, "The real problem over time for Canadian culture is... that it has had to deal with structures...controlled by the US, the UK and France."¹³⁴

The internal threat to Canadian national cultural security has to do with the state's domestic situation. The pursuit of provincial cultural development by local governments impedes the formulation of a united national cultural strategy. A telling illustration is shown by the province of Québec. Québec has never stopped pursuit of their own "paradiplomatic service," competing with its "own minister, a corps of officials specializing in international affairs, and a network of foreign representatives."¹³⁵ By the beginning of the twenty-first century, Québec had become the world's foremost

¹³² Liza Frulla, "How Culture Defines Who We Are," (paper presented as a speech at Toronto, Ontario, May 9th, 2005), accessed Mar. 17th, 2010, http://www.pch.gc.ca/pc-ch/discours-speeches/2005/frulla/2005-05-09_e.cfm.

¹³³ According to "KOF Index of Globalization 2010," the globalized degree of Canadian was ranked as the seventh of the world. See Swiss Economic Institute, "Press Release: KOF Index of Globalization 2010," 2, accessed Mar. 18th, 2010, http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/static/pdf/press_release_2010_en.pdf.

¹³⁴ Saul, "Culture and Foreign Policy," 88.

¹³⁵ Government of Québec, *Québec's Positions on Constitutional and Intergovernmental Issues. From 1936 to March 2001* (April 12, 1965), accessed Mar. 18th, 2010, http://www.saic.gouv.qc.ca/publications/Positions/Part2/PaulGuerinLajoie1965_en.pdf.

proponent of sub-national government activity in the international sphere.¹³⁶ The “separatist” policy and behaviors of the Québec government caused the Federal Government a great deal of difficulty in their efforts to implement a nationwide cultural policy or a persistently united attitude in regard to international cultural affairs.

Taking into consideration cultural threats yields to a protective preference of national cultural security being a core part of the Canadian cultural strategy. The cultural protective principle is one of the earliest cultural principles written into the national policy of the state. Early in 1951, a report from the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (known as *the Massey Commission*, after its chairman, Vincent Massey) recommended building up Canada’s cultural defenses. That is, protection of Canada’s unique cultural forms against the stifling effect of “a vast and disproportionate amount of material coming from a single alien source.”¹³⁷ This was the first time a cultural issue was credited with a legitimizing statement in Canada. In 2000, external cultural, threatened by the globalization factor, was added to the official statement of Canadian cultural diplomacy.¹³⁸

4.2.3. Benefit of the Economic and Political Affairs of Canada

In a 1997 address, the then Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, elaborated upon the importance of cultural diplomacy, in which he pointed out, in particular, the economic and political implications of the diplomatic form for Canada. He argued:

¹³⁶ Mark, “A Comparative Study,” 70.

¹³⁷ Government of Canada, “Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences,” (paper published as a report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, Ottawa: Office of the King’s Printer, 1951), accessed Mar. 18th, 2010, <http://www.collectionscanada.ca/massey/h5-407-e.html>.

¹³⁸ See Canadian Institute of International Affairs, *Culture Sans Frontière: Culture and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 2000), 4.

[Cultural diplomacy is] important not just in projecting an image of Canada in other countries, but also for the benefits to Canadian culture when our artists and performers gain a world stage. Given the relatively small audience base in Canada, Canadian artists must have access to the international marketplace to survive and flourish. Since we are increasingly obliged to share our domestic cultural markets with imports, we need to ensure access for Canadian cultural exports to foreign markets. This is, after all, an important part of our economy: there are now more Canadians employed in the cultural sector than in agriculture, for example, or in transport or construction.¹³⁹

In Robin Higham's summary regarding some crucial reasons for the Canadian Government to apply cultural diplomacy, economic and political elements were also highlighted.¹⁴⁰ The summary mentioned the importance of Canadian cultural diplomacy in generating more interest in Canada from foreign tourists, investors, and others, generating more export businesses for Canada's cultural industries, building Canada's soft power, suggesting how the Canadian model for governing its diversity might be employed to assist a peaceful co-existence, and creating an interesting.¹⁴¹ Scholar John Ralston Saul argues it is a core function of Canadian cultural diplomacy to flourish in its international trade by a "widespread, varied and accessible presence of Canadian culture in a foreign culture."¹⁴²

In summary, Canadian cultural strategy covers all three basic pursuits of cultural diplomacy. Yet, three aspects are weighed differently according to the needs and status of Canadian cultural conditions. The protection of cultural security is emphatically

¹³⁹ Lloyd Axworthy, "Notes for an Address by the Honorable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at Harbor front Centre on the Launch of Canada's Year of Asia Pacific Cultural Program," (paper presented as a speech, Toronto, Ontario, February 8th, 1997), accessed Mar. 18th, 2010, http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?Publication_id=376297&mode.

¹⁴⁰ Robin Higham, "The World Needs More Canada. Canada Needs More Canada," in *Handing down of Culture, Smaller Societies, and Globalization*, ed. Jean-Paul Baillargeonm (Ontario: Grubstreet Editions, 2001): 137

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 137-8.

¹⁴² Saul, "Culture and Foreign Policy," 87.

underscored. The economic and political function of the diplomatic form also serves as an important end. Comparatively, although constructing a national image is often addressed in the Canadian cultural strategy, less attention was paid to it than the other two pursuits.

4.3 Cultural Diplomatic Practices of Canada

This thesis investigates two aspects of Canadian cultural diplomatic practices, namely, the “inward” and “outward” practices. During the analysis, some domestic cultural diplomatic policies and actions are referred to which usually may not be attributed as cultural diplomacy. However, they are implemented by the national government and relate to the state’s cultural interactions with other cultures and cultural powers. Hence, according to the broad definition of “cultural diplomacy,” these domestic policies and actions are still regarded as a part of Canadian cultural diplomatic practices. Through investigation, this thesis attempts to provide a general interpretation of Canadian cultural diplomatic practices, including the main goals, objectives, means, and characteristics.

4.3.1 Inward Cultural Diplomatic Practices

The inward cultural diplomatic practices of Canada largely refer to the protective policies and actions of the states, aimed at defense against cultural attacks. The practices are basically intended to construct an inner protection for Canadian culture, and relate to some cultural domestic policies and regimes. They are deemed “inward” cultural diplomatic practices.

As early as 1951, a report from the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences showed a conspicuous protectionist posture toward

Canadian national culture, and underscored the necessary inward cultural diplomatic actions.¹⁴³ According to the report, there are two underlying aspects of cultural security. One is preventing inner cultural fragmentation (and furthering of the state's division). This strongly points to the cultural separatist trend in provinces such as Québec. The other is defending against external cultural threats to Canadian cultural undertakings, which relates closely to the state's cultural diplomatic practice. A telling example of this aspect is Canada's "split run magazine issue," protective policies and actions.

For a long time, Canada suffered from a serious external cultural pressure, most of which came from great cultural powers, though Canada belonged to the same cultural alliance, Canadian cultural business being one example. A recent study shows the following data:

Foreign firms and products account for 45 percent of book sales in Canada, 81 percent of English-language consumer magazines on Canadian newsstands and over 63 percent of magazine circulation revenue, 79 percent...of the retail sales of tapes, CDs, concerts, merchandise and sheet music, 85 percent...of the revenues from film distribution in Canada; and between 94 and 97 percent of screen time in Canadian theatres. The situation is most extreme in the film industry where the Hollywood studios have historically treated Canada as part of the U.S. market.¹⁴⁴

Obviously, the United States has a clear advantage over the Canadian cultural market. This, in a sense, reflects the United State's threat to Canadian culture and cultural business, and the necessity for Canada to apply protective measures. With this in mind, the Canadian government applied a series of policies to its culture and domestic cultural market such as the "split run magazine issue" policy, for example. The issue is essentially a series of examinations by the Canadian government concerning mainly American

¹⁴³ Government of Canada, "Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences."

¹⁴⁴ Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group, "Canadian Culture in a Global World."

periodicals.¹⁴⁵ It refers to utilizing commercial techniques in the magazine industry to combine common editorial content with advertising, tailored to particular markets. The treatment “allows foreign split-runs to dump editorial content in a domestic market.”¹⁴⁶ Since “the costs of the editorial content have already been covered through sales of the magazine in the magazine’s home market,” much cheaper advertising rates can be offered, rates which cannot be matched by competing magazines still required to cover their editorial costs.¹⁴⁷

This practice started in 1957 with a twenty percent tax on all advertising in split-runs of foreign periodicals within the boundaries of Canada.¹⁴⁸ A royal commission on publications then made two substantive recommendations in 1961.¹⁴⁹ Both recommendations were enacted by the government. First, Canadian advertisers were prohibited from claiming tax deductions on advertising expenditures directed at the Canadian market and placed in foreign periodicals. Second, a tariff was enacted to block the importation of foreign periodicals with advertising aimed at the Canadian market.¹⁵⁰ The protective policy was regularly implemented until 1993. In that year, the American firm, Time Warner, announced the impending publication of *Sports Illustrated*, a magazine wherein most of the edition’s editorial content emanated from outside Canada.¹⁵¹ This magazine would be transmitted electronically across the border for printing in Canada. Because the existing tariff regulation was not able to stop this transfer,

¹⁴⁵ Keith Acheson, and Christopher J. Maule, *Much Ado about Culture: North American Trade Disputes* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 187.

¹⁴⁶ Mark, “A Comparative Study,” 76.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 76-7.

¹⁴⁸ Acheson and Maule, *Much Ado about Culture*, 188.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 189.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 189-90.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 192.

the Canadian government set up a task force.¹⁵² The final response of the Canadian government stated “reaffirm[ing] its commitment to the long-standing policy objective of protecting the economic foundations of the Canadian periodical industry,” and introducing Bill C-103 to put into effect the eighty percent tax.¹⁵³ Time Warner hereby applied the dispute resolution process of the WTO. The outcome of the process was that the position taken by Time Warner was supported on all issues.¹⁵⁴ In the end, Canada had to adjust the Bill, and seek to develop a new magazine policy. In 1995, the new laws and relevant policies were published. The new policies would then not only satisfy the relevant requirements of WTO but also NAFTA.¹⁵⁵ The adjusted “split run magazine issue” system has since relieved foreign pressures on Canadian cultural business, especially in the periodical industry.

In reviewing the entire process of the “split run magazine issue” application, two points should be noted. The first point is that the practice shows an obvious protective attitude. Although the competitor is a cultural and political ally, Canada maintained a sharp vigilance over the potentially negative influence of foreign cultural power and also maintained an intense awareness of self-protection. This may be a reflection of the basic pursuit to “protect national cultural security” of the Canadian cultural strategy. On the other hand, the impact of international organizations is conspicuous. As a member, Canada must abide by their rules and ensure its domestic policies do not run counter to the policies of the international organizations.

¹⁵² See Task Force on the Canadian Magazine Industry of Government of Canada, *A Question of Balance: Report of the Task Force on the Canadian Magazine Industry* (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1994).

¹⁵³ Acheson and Maule, *Much Ado about Culture*, 192.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 194.

¹⁵⁵ Sarah Armstrong, “Magazines, Cultural Policy and Globalization: The Forced Retreat of the State?” *Canadian Public Policy-Analyse De Politiques* vol. 26, no. 3 (2000):378.

4.3.2 Outward Cultural Diplomatic Practices

Outward cultural diplomacies involve the cultural practices by which Canada actively initiates and promotes itself with other states in a bilateral and multilateral framework. Outward cultural diplomacies mainly refer to Canada's cultural diplomatic actions in global and regional international organizations, and the special programs created by the Canadian government for the spread of Canadian culture and cultural exchanges.

In the above stated case, the study reviews the process Canada adjusting its policies to fit the requirements of international organizations. In fact, Canada constructed and adjusted international norms and regimes to meet its own needs and interests. There is an instance also relating to WTO. Until the establishment of WTO in 1994, no norm or institution for international cultural trades and exchanges existed. Hence, after the founding of the organization, its members adopted two agreements in order to compete with international regimes in the area. They were the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. As one of the signers of GATS, Canada elected to take "most-favored-nation" (MFN) reservations with respect to its film and television co-production agreements, as these agreements provide more favorable treatment of partner countries, so as to "preserve the Canadian and Québécois cultures."¹⁵⁶ Canada refused to make most-favored-nation reservations for its film distribution policy, and did not opt into the GATS for audiovisual services. With Canada's diplomatic efforts, its action was accepted and agreed to by most members of the WTO. Then, the limited application of the "most-

¹⁵⁶ Acheson and Maule, *Much Ado about Culture*, 80.

favoured-nation” model in cultural trades and exchanges finally became a widely applicable and significant rule in the framework of WTO.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, Canada promoted the model within the regional institutions. The state “ensured that both the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, signed in 1988, and the NAFTA, signed between Canada, the United States and Mexico in 1994, exempted cultural industries for the provisions of the Agreement,” though the point once encountered strong opposition from the U.S.¹⁵⁸

Canada undertook similar diplomatic actions in non-economic international organizations such as UNESCO. Throughout 1998-2005, Canada “spared no effort” to establish an international regime to protect the diversity of cultural expressions, which in a sense, associates with its own national cultural security.¹⁵⁹ It

...pursued an aggressive international strategy, taking advantage of major events...to advance our objectives. Canada has been at the forefront of a well-orchestrated diplomatic offensive. ...On several occasions, Canadian diplomatic missions were asked to help build international support. The Canadian team took the lead during the negotiations in Paris to ensure that we would obtain not only a good text, but also the support of the great majority of UNESCO members. More recently, Canada succeeded in obtaining a decision by the UNESCO Executive Council to recommend that the Convention be put forward for approval at the General Assembly.¹⁶⁰

The result of the endeavors was the adoption of a “Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions” at the 33rd session of the General

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 82.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 82.

¹⁵⁹ The contemporary federal Minister of Canadian Heritage.

¹⁶⁰ Liza Frulla, “Roundtable on the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,” accessed Mar. 19th, 2010, http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/pc-ch/discours-speeches/2005/frulla/2005-10-02_e.cfm.

Conference of UNESCO, in Paris from 3 to 21 October 2005.¹⁶¹ Moreover, Canada's success in this area was not only in enhancing the competition of the Canadian cultural industry, internationally, but also in adjusting the domestic cultural situation of the state. As mentioned, there are two main threatening aspects to Canadian cultural security. Apart from external stress, the internal trend toward cultural separation also threatens national cultural security and development of the state. Yet, Canada's actions in UNESCO partially relieved this threat and strengthened the ties between the Federal Government and Québec. While promoting the Convention, the Canadian Heritage of the Federal Government held a Canadian Coalition for Cultural Diversity, in which the role of the government of Québec was singled out.¹⁶² This further reinforced the achievement of the coalition of the Federal and Québec Governments, formed in 1998, with Francophone arts organizations forming the original nucleus.¹⁶³

Besides involvement in international organizations, there is another pattern in the cultural diplomatic practice of Canada, i.e., cultural programs. The pattern may not appear to endow clear political implications or engage in specific economic ends. Instead, promoting international education and cultural exchanges are its main purpose. Nevertheless, its efforts to enhance the Canadian national image and disseminate Canadian culture and value are also significant. The ISF is an example of this aspect.

ISF is an "integrated, long-term approach to international activities and programs related to culture and sport," which "helps the Department of Canadian Heritage and its

¹⁶¹ UNESCO, "Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2005," accessed Mar. 19th, 2010, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31038&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.

¹⁶² See "A Convention on Cultural Diversity," *Canada World View* (summer 2005).

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

Portfolio partners identify priorities, align resources, and achieve new synergies.”¹⁶⁴The core aim of the ISF and relevant regimes is

...to increase the promotion of Canadian culture abroad, strengthen international dialogue on best practices in the area of social inclusion and civic participation, ensure better visibility of Canadian cultural content and expertise through new technologies, strengthen relations with the USA, increase focus on G8 and emerging global powers such as China, India and Brazil, and ensure greater coherence with overall government international priorities.¹⁶⁵

The ISF also acts as an indirect promoter to further Canada's international trade and foreign policy priorities through cultural dissemination and exchanges. ¹⁶⁶ISF has resulted in more clearly defined roles for the Canada Council in the area of “Arts, the Trade Routes Program” in the Canadian Heritage, and the DFAIT’s “Promart Program” in the area of international cultural promotion.¹⁶⁷ Both programs resolve to “carry out the state’s cultural strategy to expand international markets for Canada's cultural sector.”¹⁶⁸

All the activities have contributed to formulating a comprehensive and stable regime to support and conduct Canadian international cultural affairs and cultural diplomacy. They are not only helpful in building a positive image for Canada among the other states of the international society, but also in reinforcing the independent position of Canadian culture and in disseminating national values. Additionally, as per the following discussion regarding the phrasal achievements of cultural diplomacy, the economic and political benefits led by cultural exchanges and trades are obvious. It reflects that, although the communication-oriented pattern does not have specific economic or political

¹⁶⁴ ERICarts, *Compendium*, 9.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁶⁶ ERICarts, *Compendium*, 10.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 53.

ends, it has an effect on the state's economic development and political interactions with other states.

4.4 Phasic Results of Canadian Cultural Diplomatic Practices

In general, cultural diplomacy usually pursues long-term ends; its effects are often slow and inconspicuous which creates difficulty when investigating the practical results of cultural diplomacy. Hence, this thesis applies an indirect method to approaching this end. That is, it attempts to observe data regarding the cultural industry situation and political achievements of Canada, which may relate to its cultural diplomatic practices. The economic or political data are expected to reflect some phasic results of the diplomacy practices. Some data show the general situation of Canadian cultural business. In this thesis it is regarded as a significant expression of the influence of Canadian culture and the effect of Canadian cultural protective policies and actions. Other data express the assistant function of cultural diplomacy in the state's international cultural and political affairs, which is also a crucial aspect enabling Canada to practice cultural diplomacy.

First, according to recent data, cultural trade has made a remarkable contribution to the state's economic development:¹⁶⁹ within the main components of the Canadian economy. Cultural service exports totaled CAD 3.049 billion in 2004, an increase of 40.8 % from 2003. In the following two years, export amounts fluctuated somewhat, but generally maintained a total of over 2 billion. Film and television production and distribution services (including revived foreign location shooting of feature films and TV series in Canada and copyright royalties received by Canadian exporters) represented Canada's largest cultural service export and were valued at more than CAD 1.6 billion in

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 52-3.

2005-06. The film and video sector exported cultural goods valued at CAD 555 million in 2006, making it the second largest cultural goods exporter followed by print media with CAD 787million. Placing cultural goods and services together for 2004, Canada's cultural services trade reached CAD 1,969 billion.¹⁷⁰ The contribution of cultural tourism was also significant. Tourism in Canada was a CAD 62.7 billion industry in 2007. According to the Tourism Industry Association of Canada, more than 200,000 small and medium-sized businesses make up the industry and directly employed 625,800 Canadians in 2005 and one million indirectly, or about four per cent of Canada's workforce. According to Industry Canada, Aboriginal tourism (all tourism businesses owned or operated by First Nations, Métis, and Inuit), generated CAD 4.9 billion and employed about 13,000 people, full time, in 2001.¹⁷¹ Canada's cultural attractions also show Canada to the world and promote understanding of Canadian people, heritage, and nature. Canada ranks among the world's top 12 destinations according to the UN World Tourism Organization. More than 36 million travelers entered Canada in 2005 and many Canadians travel within their own country.¹⁷²

Canadian cultural diplomacy also contributes to political affairs. The Canadian government holds or participates in a series of cross-border intercultural dialogues and exchanges such as the OSCE Tolerance Implementation Meeting on Promoting Inter-Cultural, Inter-Religious and Inter-Ethnic Understanding, and The Youth on the Move Program. The Federal Government emphasizes cultural issues and attempts to promote Canadian culture at synthetic international conferences. For example, in June 2006, the

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 53.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 53.

¹⁷² Ibid., 54.

3rd session of the World Urban Forum was hosted by Canada. At the session, Canadian Heritage held a panel discussion entitled, "Ideas into Action: The Cultural Basis of Sustainable Community Planning", which considered cultural vitality as an integral dimension of planning for sustainability alongside economic viability, environmental responsibility and social equity. A second panel discussion entitled, "Sport as a Tool for Social Cohesion and Development–Canadian Policy Responses", considered domestic and international case studies to illustrate the value of sports as a tool for community development. In October of the same year, the Government of Canada signed a funding agreement with the Global Centre for Pluralism, and in March 2007, CAD 30 million was provided as an endowment for this organization. Canada's cultural and linguistic diversity was then identified.¹⁷³

Cultural diplomacy had a positive effect in solving problems within international relations. One telling example involves the China-Canadian relationship after 2006. Due to the diplomatic tactics of the Stephen Harper administration, the China-Canadian relationship turned frosty after Harper came to power. During this occasion, the Canadian Government utilized cultural diplomatic means to reconcile the two states' relationship. The governmental cultural institutions designed a compact cultural exchange plan to help the government restore a harmonious diplomatic relationship with their Chinese counterpart.¹⁷⁴ The plan includes summits with the leaders of both governments around certain international cultural and sport activities such as the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games

¹⁷³ Ibid., 14.

¹⁷⁴ Canadian Heritage, "2008-10 Canadian Heritage Cultural Activities in China," accessed Dec. 21st, 2010, <http://www.pch.gc.ca/pgm/ai-ia/ppp-ppp/csi-isf/chine-china-eng.cfm>.

and the Shanghai 2010 World Exposition.¹⁷⁵ Departments such as Canadian Heritage also “participate in various annual performing arts, film and publishing festivals,” such as the Beijing International Book Fair, the Guangzhou International Documentary Festival, and the Shanghai International Film Festival.¹⁷⁶ Canada actively joined in mutual cultural dialogues and other forums, which provided changes to relieve the tight relations between the two states.¹⁷⁷

Nonetheless, achievement is not the whole picture of Canadian cultural diplomatic practices. In a more macroscopic view, the external threats to culture are not entirely relieved; the disadvantaged position of the state, from a cultural aspect, has not changed significantly. In bilateral cultural exchanges, the great cultural powers still enjoy many advantages. The table in Appendix III displays the market shares of main foreign media products in Canada in 2004. The data show a considerably large share of the media market is still occupied by other states (mainly the U.S.). It expresses that the cultural threat from great cultural powers still persists.

Meanwhile, the internal threat to Canadian national security is not, for the most part, relieved. Actually, the “Requirement for one coherent voice abroad” appears not to have been realized in Canada.¹⁷⁸ Québec still serves as the main root of the problem. Québec's cultural sector has become a major component of the province’s economy, an economy which, since the 1960s, has grown to become the twenty-eighth largest

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Zhang Wenzong, “Visit, though Late, still Welcome,” *China Daily*, Dec. 12th, 2009, accessed Dec.21st, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2009-12/02/content_9098381.htm.

¹⁷⁸ Foreign Affairs Canada of Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. Diplomacy* (Ottawa: Govt. of Canada, 2005).

economy, slightly smaller than the economy of Norway.¹⁷⁹ 2000 statistics show the total activity in the cultural sector was estimated at CAD13.8 billion dollars (or 8.4 percent of Québec's GDP), with employment at around 177,000 people, in a province with a population of seven million.¹⁸⁰ On a serious note, Quebec is not the only member of the cultural separatist group. In 2006, the province of Alberta spent CAD3.8 million on the "Alberta Week in Washington," which the provincial government said aimed to "highlight and strengthen Alberta's more than CAD 60 billion a year export relationship with the United States."¹⁸¹ The province of Manitoba also planned to enhance its image internationally to advance its economic interests and to demonstrate the province's "attractiveness as a destination for international tourists, immigrants, and students."¹⁸²

In summary, Canadian cultural diplomatic practice may have contributed to the realization of the cultural strategy of Canada, and other aspects of development of the state. Nevertheless, the cultural strategy of Canada may still be inadequate in essentially changing Canada's cultural status in international society. What led to these results? Do some characteristics found in Canadian cultural diplomacy have a relation to its cultural character? Answers to these questions will be given following an analysis of the Chinese case and a comparative study.

¹⁷⁹ Earl H. Fry, "Québec's Relations with the United States," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, no. 2 (2002):6.

¹⁸⁰ Helen Clark, "Address to Seriously Asia Forum," (paper presented as a speech, Aug. 29th, 2003), accessed Mar. 19th, 2010, <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=17717>.

¹⁸¹ Government of Alberta, "Alberta at the Smithsonian," Jun. 22, 2006, accessed Mar. 19th, 2010 <http://www.gov.ab.ca/acn/200606/20141FD4B2BF8-EC20-675A-DEAC54287840C9EE.html>.

¹⁸² Government of Manitoba, "Reaching Beyond our Borders: The Framework for Manitoba's International Activities," accessed Mar. 19th, 2010, <http://www.gov.mb.ca/international/pdfs/rbob.pdf>.

CHAPTER 5

CHINESE CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Culture is always an important part of the external actions of China. The earliest official cultural diplomacy can be traced back to around 1000 B.C.E.¹⁸³ Chinese culture has profoundly influenced the Eastern Asian region, and even throughout the world. Some references show that some Western thinkers in the Enlightenment and many significant scholars in other periods were impacted by Chinese culture.¹⁸⁴ The study of Chinese cultural diplomacy will investigate its institutional setting, cultural strategy, diplomatic practical situations, and phasic results.

5.1 Institutional Setting of Chinese Cultural Diplomacy

China has constructed a complete and specific system of governmental departments to care for its cultural affairs and cultural diplomacy. It has permanent central managing segments and outpost agencies, both of which are led by the State Council and The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC).

5.1.1 The Central Sections of Chinese Cultural Diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy has approximately the same extensive history as the contemporary diplomacy of P.R.China. On November 11th, 1949,¹⁸⁵ the Foreign Cultural Affairs Liaison Bureau was set up as the first department to be specifically in charge of foreign cultural affairs, which up until then belonged to the contemporary Ministry of Culture of People's Republic of China (MC). With a series of changes throughout the

¹⁸³ BECR ed., *Overview of China's Foreign Cultural Exchange: 1949-1991* (Beijing: Guangming Daily Publish House, 1993), 12.

¹⁸⁴ Zhao Manhai, "On Voltaire's Religious Thoughts and Their Influence over Chinese Culture," *Qilu Journal* (2006): 32; Xue Qilin, "Chinese Culture in Eyes of 17th and 18th Century Western Scholars," *Journal of Xiangtan Normal University (Natural Science Edition)* vol. 21:5 (2000): 96-8.

¹⁸⁵ On October 1st, 1948, People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded.

1950s to the 1990s, the basic structure of Chinese cultural diplomatic institutions was formulated. It is a complete institutional system of cultural diplomacy presided over by the relevant segment of the State Council and the Ministry of Culture.¹⁸⁶In the two governmental departments, the regular sections in charge of the most external cultural affairs are, respectively, the Information Office (SCIO) and the Bureau for External Cultural Relations and the Office for Cultural Affairs with Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Regions of (BECR).

In 1991, international cultural exchange and external publicity works were assigned to the State Council Information Office. In 1998, the Office was combined into one institution together with the International Communication Office of CCCPC (founded in 1980)—following an archetypal Chinese political model, “a segment with two titles.”¹⁸⁷From there on in, the Office has become the main leading segment of Chinese cultural diplomacy. The works it presides over are mostly the external publicity affairs of China. As shown in Appendix IV, the section has fourteen main duties, which have been clearly defined since it was founded. There are twelve bureaus under the Office with each being responsible for different aspects of their work.¹⁸⁸ The BECR is directly under the MC. It mainly operates and manages external cultural communications and exchanges of the state. Its duties are clear as per the eight items shown in Appendix V. Different from the publicity work of SCIO, BECR focuses more on bilateral cultural exchanges and the management of the regular external cultural departments.

¹⁸⁶ Liao Kaijin, “A Study of Chinese Cultural Diplomacy” (PhD diss, the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, 2006), 98-101.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 100-1.

¹⁸⁸ SCIO, “Introduction of State Council Information Office,” accessed Apr. 22nd, 2010, www.scio.gov.cn/xwbjs/.

5.1.2 The Outpost Sections of Chinese Cultural Diplomacy

Besides the central managing departments, there are outpost sections of Chinese cultural diplomacy. They are the international extensions of the central sections. Their responsibilities are mainly to carry on the policies and plans of the central institutions and assist foreign governments, cultural groups, and individuals in understanding Chinese culture and creating cultural exchanges.

Culture Sections and Groups in Chinese Embassies abroad are one type of outpost institutions. They serve as the outpost cultural segments of MC, managing cultural affairs abroad on behalf of MC. Until April 22nd, 2010, China had set up Cultural Sections or Groups in a total of 95 countries (28 in Asia, 15 in Africa, 29 in Europe, 22 in America, and 5 in Oceania).¹⁸⁹ They have five main responsibilities as shown in Appendix VI.

Chinese Culture Centers are another significant type of outpost sections of Chinese cultural diplomacy. They are devoted to implementing cultural diplomacy. In the late 1980s, China founded the first Chinese Culture Centre in Mauritius.¹⁹⁰ In September of 2009, China had established seven Culture Centers around the world; another nine Centers were under construction.¹⁹¹ The main duties of these centers are to provide such services as cultural materials, education, and information. Conscientiously, they hold various exhibitions, film shows, and concerts, offer lecture notes from the “Discover

¹⁸⁹ See MC, “Organization,” accessed Apr. 22nd, 2010, www.ccnt.gov.cn/English/jgsz/.

¹⁹⁰ CNR.CN, “Oversea Chinese Culture Centre,” accessed Apr. 22nd, 2010, http://www.cnr.cn/2008zt/ggkf/whkf/200810/t20081010_505119709.html.

¹⁹¹ Deng Zhihui, “China Has Opened Cultural Positions in 96 Embassies of 82 Countries,” accessed Apr. 22nd, 2010, <http://www.60newchina.cn/GB/169402/170094/170096/10138556.html>.

China” series, and organize workshops about Chinese language, ancient Chinese medicine, etc.¹⁹²

The purpose of establishing Culture Centers is to fill the voids of embassy institutions with flexibility and to offer a more efficient service toward unconventional or short-term cultural visiting activities. They also contribute a distinctive service during “special times.” For example, during the SARS emergency of 2003, Chinese Culture Centers publicized the achievements of Chinese people fighting against SARS, and advised of preventative measures with respect to the epidemic. These actions effectively reduced the negative influence of SARS in China, and also enhanced China’s national image.¹⁹³

5.2 Cultural Strategy of China

China has a complete and clear cultural strategy. The former Vice-minister of MC, Meng Xiaosi, once paraphrased this strategy as “three holdings”:

Holding “Go-out” idea—regarding participated in the dominant international society, and striving to practice “Chinese Culture Goes Out” strategy; **holding a unified national identity**—connecting the central, the regional, and the oversea embassies; **holding serving the integrity of diplomacy as the compass of cultural diplomacy**—developing cultural diplomacies, extending the size of international cultural trades, and widening the scale of cultural exchanges.¹⁹⁴

The summary highlights the three main characteristics of Chinese cultural diplomacy, i.e., “publicity orientation,” “independence,” and “integrity.”

“Publicity orientation” refers to a core end of Chinese cultural diplomacy, i.e., “let China open to the world, and let the world understand China.” As a latecomer and bearer

¹⁹² CNR.CN, “Oversea Chinese Culture Centre.”

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Meng Xiaosi, “China: Cultural Diplomacy Shows its Power.”

of a different culture and ideology, China neither wants to treat the rest of the world as an enemy, nor does it want to be an enemy of the world, especially to the major powers and dominant culture bearers. Hence, while maintaining its own culture, China must find a way to let the world understand and then accept its culture and political ideas. The strategic response to this pursuit is the “Go-out” strategy. The strategy was initially posted in 1997 by the Jiang Zeming administration as an economic strategy.¹⁹⁵ In 2003, it was developed as a core cultural strategy.¹⁹⁶ Then, the successive Hu Jintao administration maintained and completed the strategy, and added it into the grand development plan of the state in 2005.¹⁹⁷ The second characteristic of Chinese culture is “independence.” As mentioned, China continually pursues an independent foreign policy of peace.¹⁹⁸ It also includes cultural independence and cultural rights in the international society.¹⁹⁹ This strategic pursuit underscores the equality of diverse cultures, and the right of states to innovate and develop in their own way.²⁰⁰ The third characteristic, “integrity,” has to do with political cultural tradition which emphasizes integral consciousness. In the early guidelines of Chinese cultural affairs, there was an interpretation, “Literature and art are subordinate to politics.”²⁰¹ Although the independence of culture and cultural affairs was elevated in some contemporary cases, the assistant function of cultural

¹⁹⁵ ECPL, *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*, vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2006), 91-4.

¹⁹⁶ See Hu Jintao, “The Speech at the National Publicity and Ideology Works Conference,” (paper presented at the Speech at the National Publicity and Ideology Works Conference, Dec. 5th, 2003).

¹⁹⁷ Refer to Jin Yuanpu and Zhuang Jiangang, “How Can China Deal with the Cultural ‘Trade Deficit’?” *China Comment* vol. 8 (2005); and CCCPCC, “Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s Suggestions of National Economy and Social Development Five-Year Plan proposal,” accessed Apr. 21st, 2010, Oct. 18th, 2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005-10/18/content_3640318.htm.

¹⁹⁸ Foreign Affairs of China, “China’s Independent Foreign Policy of Peace,” accessed Dec. 24th, 2010, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wjzc/t24881.htm>.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁰ Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004).

²⁰¹ Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, 88.

diplomacy to the general development strategy has never been reduced. Most acts of Chinese cultural strategies are required to be consistent with the general “peaceful development” strategy of the state.²⁰²

In official documents related to cultural diplomacy, different foci on the three aforementioned aspects of cultural strategy are stated, while in the majority of cases, they are cited together.²⁰³ The three aspects may also have a corresponding relation to the three basic pursuits of cultural strategy which is assumed in Chapter 1.

5.2.1 Constructing a Positive National Image for China

The “publicity orientation” aspect in Chinese cultural strategy may respond to the basic pursuit of national image construction. As mentioned above, as a former enemy and a state with vast ideological and cultural differences, it is not an easy task for China to gain trust from major world powers and the world conducted by them. In this case, constructing a positive national image is significant and immediate for the state. This point has been taken into account ever since China intended to open its doors to the world. As the then leader, Deng Xiaoping, indicated in 1978, “Internationally, we should build a good image to manifest our nation is stable and united.”²⁰⁴

²⁰² Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard ed., *“Harmonious World” and China’s New Foreign Policy* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008), 6-7. By the way, the original term “peaceful rise” has been quietly dropped and has been replaced with “peaceful development.”

²⁰³ See Jiang Zeming, “Comprehensively Build Prosperous Society, Initiate New Situation of Socialist Construction,” (paper presented at the Sixteenth Central Committee of CPC, Nov. 8th, 2002); Li Changchun, “Li Changchun Emphasizes to Seize the Strategic Opportunity in order to Initiate New Situation of Works,” *People’s Daily* Jan. 11th, 2003, First edition; and Hu Jintao, “Holding High the Great Banner of Socialism, Struggle for the New Success of the Construction of Comprehensive Prosperous Society,” (paper presented at the Seventeenth Central Committee of CPC, Oct. 15th, 2007), and Wen Jiabao, “The Report on the Work of the Government,” (paper presented at the Third Session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress, Mar. 5th, 2010).

²⁰⁴ Leng Rong et al, *A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping 1975-1997* (Beijing: Central Literary Contributions Publishing Bureau, 2004), 527.

This idea was then specified and strategized. In 1997, President Jiang Zemin pointed out that the process of constructing a positive national image “should sufficiently apply various measures and channels to actualize international cultural exchange so as to learn the other countries’ cultural advantages, and also to show the achievement of the cultural undertakings of China.”²⁰⁵In 1999, he reiterated the point.²⁰⁶Li Changchun, the leader of the Cultural Department of CPC also emphasized the significant value of a national image for the Party and the state’s culture publicity affairs and cultural undertakings during another occasions.²⁰⁷

The contemporary Hu Jintao administration maintained the basic spirit of this strategic principle.²⁰⁸Furthermore, the strategic goal of constructing a positive national image was re-interpreted to extend to the world’s development, overall. In both the speech for the United Nations 60th Anniversary Summit and the speech at Yale University, Hu Jintao promoted a “harmonious world” idea and highlighted the contributions of Chinese culture to the construction of a harmonious world. Via these declarations and relevant actions, the cultural strategy goal of constructing a positive national image has been integrated into the “Peaceful Development” strategy of the state, and also as a developing direction, in China’s view, not only for China but also the whole world.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁵ CPLR, *Selected Important Official Documents After the Fifteenth Central Committee of CPC*, vol. I (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003), 37.

²⁰⁶ Jiang Zemin, *An Analysis of “Three Represent”* (Beijing: Central Literary Contributions Publishing Bureau, 2001), 16.

²⁰⁷ Li Changchun, “Li Changchun Emphasizes to Seize the Strategic Opportunity.”

²⁰⁸ See “The Tenth Diplomatic Envoys Conference Started” *People’s Daily*, Aug. 30th, 2004, First edition; and Qian Tong, “The Eleventh Diplomatic Envoys Conference Started; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Publish Speeches,” accessed Apr. 21st, 2010, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2009-07/20/content_1370171.htm.

²⁰⁹ See Hu Jintao, “Struggle for the Construction of a Long-term Peaceful and Together-prosperous Harmonic World,” (paper presented at the the United Nations 60th Anniversary Summit, Sep. 15th, 2005);

5.2.2 Protecting the National Cultural Security of China

The aspect of “cultural independence” in the Chinese cultural strategy corresponds to the basic pursuit of “national cultural security.” Although Chinese culture has a long history and profound influence in the East Asian area, to a global extent, the cultural power of China remains weak. To quote the terms of Long Xinmin, the former Director of GAPP and the current Vice-director of the Central Party History Research Center of CPC, “Despite a state with rich cultural accumulation, China is far from a state with strong cultural power.”²¹⁰ Hence, protecting national cultural security is a significant developmental task for China and a core goal for Chinese cultural diplomacy.²¹¹ Meanwhile, the external environment, particularly the prevalence of cultural intrusions following increasingly deepening globalization and the lessons of “color revolutions” of Eastern European countries also drive the Chinese government to defending potential cultural threats from great cultural powers.²¹² The internal separatist forces in Xinjiang and Tibet enhance this concern.²¹³ Additionally, the cultural protective attitude and actions connect with international undertakings to protect cultural diversity. That is what Chinese leaders have declared many times on various international occasions that “It does

and Hu Jintao, “Speech in Yale University of the U.S.,” (paper presented as a speech in Yale University, the U.S., Apr. 22nd, 2006).

²¹⁰ YNET.com, “Wang Qishan ‘Intercepts’ Microphone for A Chance to Speak,” *Beijing Youth Daily* Mar. 8th, 2006, accessed Dec. 24th, 2010, <http://bjyouth.ynet.com/article.jsp?oid=7954835>.

²¹¹ Meng Xiaosi, “China: Cultural Diplomacy Shows its Power,” *People’s Daily*, Nov. 11th, 2005, Seven edition.

²¹² Chen Qiaozhi and Li Shiyan, “The Threat from Western Cultural Hegemony and the Security Choice of Chinese National Culture,” *Journal of Jinan University(Philosophy & Social Science Edition)*, vol.28:1 (2006):1.

²¹³ See SARA, “China’s State Administration of Religious Affairs spokesman on Vatican Criticism on the Eighth Congress of Chinese Catholic,” GOV.CN, accessed Dec. 24th, 2010, http://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2010-12/22/content_1770984.htm; Hu Jintao, “Hu Jintao’s speech at the Forum for commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Publication of ‘A Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan,’” (paper presented at the Forum for commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Publication of “A Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan”, Dec. 21st, 2008), and Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese’s Soft Power,” 18.

not believe in uniform solutions for every situation, nor does it favor ‘one big, shock-therapy leap.’ Instead, it emphasizes development based on a country’s own characteristics, with a ‘ruthless willingness to innovate and experiment.’”²¹⁴

5.2.3 The Benefit to Chinese Economic and Political Affairs

The “integrity” characteristic suggests an economic and political implication of the Chinese cultural strategy. China intends to realize a “peaceful development.” The “peaceful development” includes “on the one hand the need to build up China’s regional and global power and influence, and on the other, reassure other countries about how it will use this rising power and influence.”²¹⁵ To approach this goal, Chinese cultural diplomacies are planned following the overall situation of economic and political development of the state.

Economically, the “Go Out” has an economic implication, per se.²¹⁶ In cultural diplomacy the strategic goal is to promote cultural industry.²¹⁷ In 2005, the Chinese government promulgated “Suggestions about the Works of Enhancing and Modifying Exportation of Cultural Productions and Services,” by which the economic function of external cultural action was systematically and specifically emphasized.²¹⁸ In the national development strategy, cultural tools have also been treated as being of assistance to economic development.²¹⁹

²¹⁴ Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese’s Soft Power,” 17.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 23.

²¹⁶ ECPL, *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*, vol. 2 (Beijing: Ren min chu ban she, 2006), 91-4.

²¹⁷ See Hu Jintao, “the Speech at the National Publicity and Ideology Works Conference,” (paper presented at the Speech at the National Publicity and Ideology Works Conference, Dec. 5th, 2003).

²¹⁸ Jin Yuanpu and Zhuang Jiayang, “How can China Deal with the Cultural ‘Trade Deficit.’”

²¹⁹ CCCPC, “Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s Suggestions of National Economy and Social Development Five-Year Plan proposal,” Oct. 18th, 2005, accessed Apr. 21st, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005-10/18/content_3640318.htm.

Politically, cultural diplomacy is applied as the “clarion,” “point man,” and “lubricant” for Chinese political diplomacy among states.²²⁰ One of its core duties is to enhance the awareness of foreign states about China and the Chinese “peaceful development strategy.” It is also responsible for “the construction of ‘Cultural China’ in order to undermine the negative influence of the ‘China Threat’ accusation and the demonized anti-China bashing.”²²¹ As an integral part of the overall development strategic system, Chinese cultural diplomacy undertakes to not only specify cultural ends but also take on the assistant task of economic and political development of the state.

Overall, the Chinese cultural strategy includes the three basic pursuits of our assumptions in Chapter 1. Furthermore, the three pursuits formed an integral part of the grand development strategy of the state.

5.3 Cultural Diplomatic Practices of China

Cultural diplomatic practices are usually an important part of Chinese diplomatic actions. This thesis investigates the practices of the two categories, namely, the inward and outward practices of Chinese cultural diplomacy.

5.3.1 Inward Cultural Diplomatic Practices

Inward cultural diplomatic practices generally include two aspects. One has to do with constructing a positive domestic environment for international cultural exchanges and portraying an image of “responsible great power” for China. It is carried out through a series of governmental actions and legislative acts in order to protect intellectual property of foreign cultural productions and legalize and simplify the processes of

²²⁰ Meng Xiaosi, “The Cultural Mission of China in the Era of Peaceful Development,” *People’s Daily*, Jul. 27th, 2004, Seventh edition.

²²¹ *Ibid.*

international cultural exchanges and trades within China. For example, in 1993, the State Council promulgated the *Regulations of Border Protection of Intellectual Property*.²²² One of the aims of the regulation was to “promote external scientific and cultural exchanges.”²²³ The *Regulation* provides guarantees for international trades of cultural productions and international cultural exchanges. It also protects the intellectual property and relevant rights of Chinese cultural productions in international exchanges. Additionally, as for the rampant piracy in China and the serious damage caused to the Chinese national image, the Chinese Government has applied a series of actions to fight piracy, and, in November 2010, promulgated specific regulations to control piracy.²²⁴

The other aspect of inward cultural action is the protection of the state’s own cultural resources. It is conducted through governmental regulations and laws such as the *Act of the Protection of Traditional Arts and Crafts* (1997), *Law of People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Cultural Relics* (2002), and *New Modification of Legal Festival and Holidays* (Draft) (2007).²²⁵ Inward cultural action is reflected in government programs such as the “National Folk Culture Protection Project of China” held by the Ministry of Culture, and the foundation of “Huangdi Mausoleum Funding” led by the People’s Bank of China.²²⁶

²²² State of Council, *People’s Republic of China State Council Decree (NO. 395)*, accessed Dec. 24th, 2010, http://www.gov.cn/zwggk/2005-05/23/content_186.htm.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Sun Shuai, “SARFT Seriously Beats Internet Piracies,”

²²⁵ See *Law of People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Cultural Relics*, accessed Apr. 22nd, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-10/29/content_611362.htm.

²²⁶ Zhao Enuo, “Feng Jicai: Focus on the Folk, Rescue Culture,” *People’s Daily* Apr. 7th, 2006, Seventeenth edition; “Draft of New Modification of Legal Festival and Holidays Is Promulgated Today, Suggestions Are Requested,” accessed Apr. 22nd, 2010, <http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/xwzx/fzxw/200711/20071100054354.shtml>; HMF, “Introduction of the Funding,” accessed Apr. 22nd, 2010, <http://www.hdl.org.cn/view.asp?id=375>.

The laws and policies ensure the appropriate and legal application of cultural resources and also protect the sustainable development of Chinese cultural undertakings.

5.3.2 Outward Cultural Diplomatic Practices

The outward cultural diplomacies are the main body of Chinese cultural diplomatic practices. They are applied via two frameworks. In the bilateral framework, improvement to the competition of the Chinese cultural industry in international markets and the promotion and exhibition of Chinese culture are underlined. In the multilateral framework, the struggle for the legal position and protection of international cultural diversity is the focus of the practice. Meanwhile, publicizing the Chinese development idea and political propositions travels through the various practices in both frameworks.

1) Bilateral Cultural Diplomatic Practice

In the bilateral framework, there are mainly three types of actions, namely, strengthening the national cultural industry, developing the educational industry, and holding cultural publicity activities. In their practical process, “market orientation” is often highlighted.

Early in 1979, the business performance created by state-owned artistic organizations and enterprises went international.²²⁷ In the three decades since, its scale gradually expanded. Many artistic works and performances with rich Chinese cultural elements, such as *Shaolin* and *Dynamic Yunnan*, have been shown on the international stage. The Acrobatic Ballet, *Swan Lake*, played abroad 189 times before 2007, and its gross income reached 43 million RMB (about 6.5 million USD). In 2007, gross income alone from business performances abroad, on behalf of the China Arts & Entertainment

²²⁷ Cai Wu, “Cai Wu: The Development of External Cultural Works of China in the Sixty Years of the New China,” accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, <http://culture.people.com.cn/GB/22226/154984/155051/9820259.html>.

Group which is a subordinate enterprise of the Ministry of Culture of China, had reached 88.9 million dollars.²²⁸ The structure of China's publication business has also ameliorated. The rate between imports and exports of copyrights has reduced from 15:1 in 1997 to 5:1 in 2007; the number of exported newspapers and periodicals imported by more than 80 countries is over 4 million with a rise of 62.4% per year.²²⁹ Besides the economic achievements, the Chinese culture is also promoted to foreign people via the performances and publications.

Additionally, the Chinese government attempts to enhance the influence of Chinese culture by promoting international student exchanges and language education. In 2009, approximately 421,100 Chinese students went abroad to study,²³⁰ one third of which are supported by the Chinese government. In the same year, 230,000 foreign students came to China.²³¹ Over three-quarters of the foreign students went to China to study academic disciplines in general cultural areas (Chinese language, arts, history, philosophy and traditional Chinese medicine).²³² Both the Chinese students who went overseas to study and the arrival of foreign students increased the awareness to the world of economic, political, and social situations of modern China. Relevant data shows actions have begun to manifest their effects. China has become one of the "new popular destinations" of international students.²³³

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ UNESCO, *Global Education Digest 2009: Comparing Education Statistics across the World* (Montreal: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2009), 38, and CSC, *Annual Report 2008* (Beijing: China Scholarship Council), 7.

²³¹ Wang Peng, "There Are More Than 230 Million Foreign Students in China in 2009," accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, <http://www.moe.edu.cn/edoas/website18/level3.jsp?tablename=2038&infoid=1269244278510339>.

²³² See Ministry of Education, *China Education Yearbook* (Beijing: People's Publishing House 2006).

²³³ UNESCO, *Global Education Digest 2009*, 39, 43.

The Chinese government also trains a large number of teachers and provides sufficient financial supports to promote Chinese language education abroad. “With an annual budget of \$200 million, the China National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language has launched a language-promotion network, aiming to quadruple the number of foreigners studying Chinese to 100 million by 2010.”²³⁴ On a worldwide scale, learning Chinese has met with great enthusiasm as verified with the example of the Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (HSK)—the Chinese proficiency test. The test belongs to the “Chinese Bridge Project,” supported by the government and led by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture.²³⁵ It is known as the Chinese “TOEFL.”²³⁶ The exam has seen an annual increase in examinees of approximately 40–50%, growth equivalent to the TOEFL examination in its first ten years.²³⁷ So far, HSK test centers have been established in eighty-seven cities of thirty-five countries.²³⁸

The Confucius Institution is another significant form in which China can create external cultural dissemination. It has two operating forms, namely, “Confucius Institution” and “Confucius Classroom.” Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang provide an interpretation of the function and diplomatic implication of the Institution. They indicate:

Like the British Council, the Goethe Institute, and the Maison Française, the new network of Confucius Institutes has a political agenda: to present a kinder and gentler image of China to the outside world. Furthermore, by teaching Beijing’s preferred version of Chinese, and utilizing readings

²³⁴ Tim Johnson, “China Muscles In: From Trade to Diplomacy to Language, the U.S. Is Being Challenged,” *The Gazette (Montreal)*, Oct. 30th, 2005.

²³⁵ Center of Chinese Proficiency Test, “General Introduction,” accessed Dec. 24th, 2010, http://www.hsk.org.cn/english/Intro_summ.aspx.

²³⁶ “Teaching of English as a foreign language (TOEFL)” is a popular adopted test for English proficiency presently, which is held by Educational Testing Service (ETS) of the U.S.

²³⁷ “Big Increase in Chinese ‘TOEFL’ Examinees.” *People’s Daily*, Jan. 8th, 2002, accessed Dec. 24th, 2010, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/culture/53027.htm>.

²³⁸ Li Jiangtao, “China Will Found Confucius Institutions in order to Promote Goble Study of Chinese,” accessed Apr. 22nd, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-12/23/content_2373866.htm.

from a Beijing perspective, rather than the traditional Chinese characters used in Taiwan or Taiwan-based points of view, the Institutes also serve to advance China's foreign-policy goal of marginalizing Taiwan's international influence.²³⁹

By the end of 2009, 282 Confucius Institutes and 272 Confucius Classrooms were established in 88 countries. Additionally, some 250 institutions from over 50 countries have expressed interest in establishing Confucius Institutes/Classrooms, including some of the world's top universities.²⁴⁰

Apart from the cultural industry and educational areas, a series of official cultural activities also comprise an indispensable part of Chinese outward cultural diplomacy. In 2002, in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of China-Japanese normal diplomatic relationship and the 10th anniversary of the China-South Korean normal diplomatic relationship, China held "Chinese Culture Years" in Japan and South Korea. Then, from 2003 to 2010, "Chinese Culture Year" was held in Russia, Italy, Spain, Germany, Greece, France, Britain, and many other countries.²⁴¹ Besides the relatively long culture year activities, the Chinese government also manages short-term cultural exchanges such as the "Cultural Season" and "Cultural Festival."²⁴² For instance, the "China Culture Festival" was conducted in Washington D.C., U.S. from October 1st to 29th of 2005.²⁴³ Sponsorship from the Chinese government alone reached two million dollars.²⁴⁴ Similar

²³⁹ Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese's Soft Power," 18.

²⁴⁰ Hanban, "About Confucius Institution/Classroom," accessed Dec. 24th, 2010, http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm.

²⁴¹ See relevant information in specific website of "Les Annees Chine-France," accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, <http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/cfc/>.

²⁴² See Sun Jiazheng ed., *Culture Almanac of China 2001* (Beijing : Xinhua Publish House, 2002), 110, and website of "Le Festival Croisements 2010," accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, <http://www.faguowenhua.com/spip.php?rubrique82&lang=fr>.

²⁴³ Yang Qingchuan, "'China Culture Festival' Closes in the U.S., More than 400 Thousand Audiences Attends," accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, <http://www.xswh.gov.cn/Subject/Article/2005-10-31/2005103115591720.shtml>.

²⁴⁴ Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese's Soft Power," 19.

short-term cultural activities were held in Iceland, Chile, Venezuela, Moldova, India, Burma, Argentina, America, and Russia from 2001 to 2006.²⁴⁵ Through various activities, China introduced itself to the world and contributes to weakening the negative influence of the “China Threat” perspective and the demonized anti-China propaganda.²⁴⁶

2) Multilateral Cultural Diplomacy

Three patterns form the multilateral framework, i.e., holding international meetings or activities, addressing the state’s cultural idea in international organizations, and promoting international cultural agreements.

An example of holding international meetings/activities would be the 29th Olympic Games, held in Beijing in 2008. In a sense, the “summit type” opening ceremony showed the weight of various states to China. The “Green Olympic Games,” “High-Tech Olympic Games,” and “People’s Olympic Games” themes expressed the Chinese government’s determination to contribute to a sustainable and harmonious world. The excellent performances of Chinese athletes, qualitative services, and convenient volunteer services manifested the country’s strong national power and peaceful spirit to the world. Everyone gave positive points to China’s international image. Additionally, the economic benefits of the Games were considerable. According to recent statistics, the direct income from the Beijing Olympic Games (including the Paralympic Games) was 21.363 billion RMB (about 3.2 billion USD); the direct profit was more than 1 billion

²⁴⁵ Ministry of Finance, “‘China Culture Festival’ Opens in Iceland, the President Grimsson Publishes a Speech,” accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, http://intl.ce.cn/gjzx/oz/bd/zbhz/200710/12/t20071012_13218429.shtml.

²⁴⁶ Meng Xiaosi, “The Cultural Mission of China in the Era of Peaceful Development,” *People’s Daily*, Jul. 27th, 2004, Seventh edition.

RMB (about 146.5 million USD).²⁴⁷ In this case, cultural, political, and economical gain equaled a three-fold win. Another similar instance is the recently concluded Shanghai World Expo.²⁴⁸ The Chinese government held “the Olympic Games in Economic, Scientific, and Cultural Area” s “a vast ceremony of mankind civilizations.”²⁴⁹ Two hundred and forty-one countries participated and a total of 73.1 million people attended. Recently, similar activities were held involving the Beijing International Book Fair, the Guangzhou International Documentary Festival, the Hong Kong International Film Festival, and the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games. By means of these global and regional events, the Chinese government, on the one hand, disseminates its political propositions to the world, and on the other hand, expresses the national strength and the international influence of Chinese culture.

The second type of multicultural framework involves attending meetings of international organizations and addressing China’s cultural views. For instance, in September 2000, the then President of China, Jiang Zemin, posted the “culturally colorful world” notion in his speech at the United Nations Millennium Summit.²⁵⁰ In the speech presented at the United Nations 60th Anniversary Summit, the present President, Hu Jintao, iterated this point. He argued, “The diversity of civilizations is the basic nature of

²⁴⁷ Yin Lijuan, “The Direct Income of Beijing Olympic Game is 21.3 Billion Yuan,” XINHUA.NET, accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/sports/2010-02/10/content_12960600.htm.

²⁴⁸ “World Expo(sition)” is a major international exhibition held by a country and participated in by countries and international organizations with a purpose to show mankind’s achievements in social, economic, cultural, scientific, and technological areas.

²⁴⁹ “Never End, Shanghai Expo: Congratulate the Closure of the Expo,” *People’s Daily*, Nov. 1st, 2010.

²⁵⁰ Jiang Zemin, “Speech for Millennium Summit of the United Nations,” *People’s Daily*, Sep. 7th, 2000, First edition.

a human being, and the crucial motivation of the advancement of human civilization....The diversity should be protected with spirits of equality and open-up.”²⁵¹

These two examples show an archetypal mode of China to practice cultural diplomacy within a multilateral framework. That is, China prefers to associate its own pursuit with a common agreement of most member countries rather than declaring China’s legal international rights directly, and alone. Apart from a few special diplomatic aims, this pattern of expression also suggests the positive aspect of China’s rise to the world and the shared benefits with other countries from this rising power.²⁵²

The third pattern in the multilateral framework is the promotion of international cultural agreements within international organizations or special international cultural meetings. China’s activities in UNESCO can be used as an example. China began to participate in UNESCO’s various activities in 1979. In 1982, a Chinese delegation, led by the contemporary Minister of Culture, Zhu Muzhi, joined the Second World Conference on Cultural Policy, and participated in drawing up the famous Mexico Declaration of Culture.²⁵³ Based upon the Declaration, along with the endeavors of China and other members, the *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity* was adopted by the 21st Conference of UNESCO.²⁵⁴ In 1985, China participated in the *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage*, which, in the last 20 years,

²⁵¹ Hu Jintao, “Struggle for the Construction of a Long-term Peaceful and Together-prosperous Harmonic World.”

²⁵² Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese’s Soft Power,” 23.

²⁵³ UNESCO, *List, By Subject, of the Recommendations of International Conferences on Cultural Policy*, accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0004/000495/049538eb.pdf>.

²⁵⁴ UNESCO, *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity*, accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf>.

secured 35 items under a world heritage designation.²⁵⁵ During the World Heritage Commission Conference in 2005, with the endeavors of China, an important international agreement concerning multicultural protection, “Suzhou Agreement,” was signed by the participating states.²⁵⁶

China is also devoted to preserving the diversity of culture in regional institutions. In 2002, based on the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China organized a Summit of Ministers of Culture of Member Countries of SCO. In this conference, a *Joint Statement of Ministers of Culture of SCO Countries* was adopted, which provides the basic legal reference for cultural communications and cultural security between China and Mid-East countries.²⁵⁷ The summit has become a regular institution with the latest summit being held in Sanya, China in March of 2010.²⁵⁸ In December of 2003, China held the ASEM Conference on Culture and Civilization. This meeting, as per China’s suggestion, was entitled “Cultural Diversity and Integration,” and adopted the *Chairman’s Statement* for promoting and preserving cultural diversity employing the integrated activities of the members.²⁵⁹ In the ASEM Summit of 2004, held in Hanoi, Vietnam, the *ASEM Declaration on Dialogue among Cultures and Civilizations*

²⁵⁵ “China Becomes the Third Largest Country of World Heritage,” accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, <http://www.ht-art.com.cn/details.asp?id=1120>.

²⁵⁶ See UNESCO, *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity*, accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127160m.pdf>, World Heritage Committee, *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. WHC-04/28.COM/6* (Pairs: UNESCO World Heritage Centre, March 2004), 37.

²⁵⁷ SCO, *Joint Statement of Ministers of Culture of SCO Countries*, accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, <http://www.ccnt.com.cn/news/shownews.php?id=1018857189>.

²⁵⁸ SCO, “The Summit of Ministers of Culture of SCO Countries Starts at Sanya,” accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, <http://www.sectSCO.org/CN/show.asp?id=345>.

²⁵⁹ ASEM, *Chairman’s Statement* (published at the ASEM Conference on Cultures and Civilizations, Beijing, China, Dec. 4th, 2003).

was raised by China and France.²⁶⁰ Its assertion of respecting civilizational diversity and upholding dialog and tolerance among different cultures were strongly welcomed and supported by the attending countries. In the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and 10+3, similar cultural protective institutions were constructed based on the suggestion and endeavors of China.²⁶¹

5.4 Phasic Results of Chinese Cultural Diplomacy

Following the study approach of Canadian cases, relevant achievements and data are referred to in order to observing the phasic results of Chinese cultural diplomatic practices. In the discussion above, the increasing influence of China in economic and cultural aspects is mentioned. The aspects are reflected by those achievements in cultural industry, educational undertakings, and cultural publicities. Besides these achievements, China may have gradually influenced other states' development and political style. As Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang's describe:

This [Chinese style] appears to be influencing the development paths of many countries. Russian President Putin seems to be following the Chinese path by restricting democracy while giving greater emphasis to getting his economic house in order. Other former Soviet republics, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, have looked to China rather than the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for new economic thinking...Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that India should look to China as a role model for economic growth and global trade...The leftist union leader turned Brazilian President Luis Inacio "Lula" da Silva reportedly sent study teams to Beijing to learn from the Chinese experience...the Chinese model has been so influential in Iran that it became one of the main themes of a major candidate, former president Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, in the 2005 presidential elections...While Laos moves toward the Chinese model of market-based authoritarianism,

²⁶⁰ ASEM, *ASEM Declaration on Dialogue among Cultures and Civilizations*, accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, http://www.mfa.go.th/internet/ASEM/DECLARATION_among_cultures_and_Civilisations_asem5.pdf.

²⁶¹ See website of FCA, accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, <http://www.focac.org/chn/>.

Vietnam insists on placing stability before political reform after its adoption of Chinese-style economic reform.²⁶²

Of course, they are not behooved to be absolutely attributed to the achievements of Chinese cultural publicity and cultural diplomacy. Yet, the phenomena in the description may represent the growing influence of China and what Chinese cultural diplomacy pursues, in a sense. Additionally, such popularity and influence of a Chinese style of governance and development may be difficult to realize without cultural agreement by those states, and cultural diplomacy is indubitably one of the most important means with which to construct this type of agreement.

However, the existing achievements do not mean a “complete success” of Chinese cultural diplomacy. In fact, in spite of decades of cultural diplomatic practices and efforts in other aspects, Chinese culture is still not completely “accessible” in every corner of the world, especially dominate culture powers. At least, according to the reference above, it is noted that the states perhaps influenced by Chinese culture are mostly Asia and developing states. Then, what are the attitudes towards China of those Western and developed states?

A recent BBC World Service poll regarding the “public view” of states in current international society may provide a few answers to this question. The poll was drawn from the answers of face-to-face or telephone interviews of 13,575 citizens in Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama), Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Russia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United

²⁶² Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese’s Soft Power,” 21.

States between 21st November 2008 and 1st February 2009.²⁶³ It showed that “views of China are now divided, with positive ratings having slipped six points to 39 per cent, while 40 per cent are now negative.” According to this poll, China may not be widely accepted to a global extent. While its culture has influences, in this case it is largely limited to the Asian and developing countries and thus, the cultural position of China, in the international cultural structure, may not change significantly. .

Additionally, China’s own cultural power is not strong enough. As an example, while its cultural products, with ‘Made in China’ labels, appear to be everywhere, China is still no match for the United States in respect to cultural attractiveness—few Chinese companies, cultural icons, movies or brand names have the ubiquity of Microsoft, MTV, Mickey Mouse or Big Macs.²⁶⁴ According to a National Information Security Report, only 4% of global information resources are carried in Chinese, although China accounts for one-fifth of the global population.²⁶⁵

China is easily meshed in disputes or conflicts with other states regarding some cultural issues, particularly those states believing in Western cultural values. For instance, in 2003, China was engaged in disputes with Korea over the application of World Heritage sites. In that year, China applied to UNESCO to have Koguryo-era tombs and murals located on its side of the Yalu River registered as a World Cultural Heritage site, a step interpreted by Koreans as exerting an historical Chinese claim to the broader Koguryo territory, including what is now North Korea. It triggered strong anti-Chinese

²⁶³ BBC World Service, *Views of China and Russia Decline in Global Poll*, accessed Apr. 23rd, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/06_02_09bbcworldservicepoll.pdf.

²⁶⁴ Nye, *Soft Power*, 33-4.

²⁶⁵ Liu Changle, “The Fluent World and the Mission of Chinese Media,” presented at the Second World Chinese Media Forum, Sept, 22nd, 2003.

protests in South Korea in 2003–2004.²⁶⁶ A similar phenomenon occurred later when Korea successfully applied the “Jianglin Dragon Boat Festival” custom as World Intangible Cultural Heritage. But this time, it was the Chinese people who showed hostility in response to Korea’s action.²⁶⁷

Another event that raised extensive arguments is the “Google event,” in which China was described as a preventer of freedom of information by western media. China has the largest population of internet users in the world. According to statistics from the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), the population of Chinese internet users has reached 384 million.²⁶⁸ Yet, the censorship of internet use by the Chinese government was challenged by the biggest search engine operator of the world, Google. Google then announced in January, 2010 that it would shut down its operations in China mainly due to Chinese cyber attacks on its corporate infrastructure. Its complaints fall into two categories: “surveillance of the online activities of human-rights activists through unauthorized accessing of Google-based e-mail (Gmail) accounts in China and the world, and the theft of intellectual property.”²⁶⁹ China immediately echoed that China’s internet is open; the Chinese government has been striving to construct a healthy developing environment.²⁷⁰ The result of the event is Google closed its research engine in

²⁶⁶ David Scofield, “Northeast Asia's Intra-mural Mural Wars,” *Asian Times Online*, Dec. 23rd, 2003, accessed Dec. 24th, 2010, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/EL23Dg01.html>.

²⁶⁷ “The Rethinking of the Event Korean Successfully Applied Dragon Boat Festival as World Cultural Heritage,” *The Beijing News*, Dec. 4th, 2005, accessed Dec. 24th, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-12/04/content_3873709.htm.

²⁶⁸ CNNIC, *Report of the Development of Chinese Internet* (Beijing: Internet Information Centre, Jan. 2010), 10.

²⁶⁹ Christopher R. Hughes, “Google and the Great Firewall,” *Survival* vol.52:2 (2010): 19.

²⁷⁰ Zhou Zhaojun, “The Foreign Affair Respond to the ‘Google-China Withdrawing,’” accessed May 11th, 2010, <http://media.people.com.cn/GB/40606/10770484.html>.

the mainland of China, while Chinese internet users can still utilize Google research via the engine in Hong Kong.

In this thesis, there would be no debate whether China or Korea/Google is “right” in these events. However, these events may be sufficient to suggest that, although a peaceful development strategy has been carried on in Chinese cultural diplomatic practices, and although Chinese cultural diplomacies struggle to construct harmonious international relations of the state with other states, disputes and mutual incomprehension between China and the states does exist, particularly involving cultural issues. Although, the positive results of China’s cultural diplomacy are noted, some aspects or situations may never change.

CHAPTER 6

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CULTURAL DIPLOMATIC DIFFERENCES AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

The relationship between two variables is a basic assessment of their connections, and also the general awareness of all the potential mutual influences between them. The aim of this thesis is to explore the relations between states' cultural diplomatic differences and their cultural differences. Based on studies of Canadian cases and Chinese cases, the thesis purposes to compare their cultural diplomacies from four perspectives (institutional setting, cultural strategy, diplomatic process, and phasic result). Furthermore, this thesis seeks the relations of the differences shown in these perspectives with the cultural differences of the two states.

6.1 A Comparison of Institutional Settings of Cultural Diplomacy

According to the case studies, obvious differences exist between Canadian and Chinese cultural diplomacies. And the differences may relate to the different cultures of the two states, since "culture and institutions have a symbiotic relationship....Institutions are customary structures and practices."²⁷¹

One very conspicuous difference between the two states' cultural diplomatic institutions is the structures of the institutional settings. No specific official department in the Canadian government is in charge of cultural diplomacy. Instead, the diplomatic practices are designed and implemented via ad hoc inter-ministerial cooperation. The lead sections of these practices are also non-specific, which are usually run by Canadian

²⁷¹ Wiseman, *In Search*, 59.

Heritage, a department mainly responsible for domestic cultural affairs,²⁷² or DFAIT, a department mainly responsible for foreign affairs and international trade. Additionally, no permanent outpost sections exist abroad in the institutional setting of Canada. However, there is one section (the Academic Relations Division) in the Canadian government specifically in charge of affairs related to international organizations. The provincial governments of Canada have strong autonomy in cultural diplomacy, so they are able to formulate cultural exchanges with foreign states or regions by themselves, and pursue a relatively independent cultural image and cultural relations apart from the Federal Government.

Correspondingly, China has a large, specific, and systematical institutional system for cultural diplomatic practice. It is a self-contained central-outpost setting. At the central level, the SCIO and BECR lead the regular external cultural exchanges, publicity, and other external cultural affairs. At the outpost level, Culture Sections and Groups in Chinese Embassies and Chinese Cultural Centers are established as permanent agencies of the Chinese Ministry of Culture. Not only is there a self-contained institutional system, but every segment in the system has its own well-defined duties. Another characteristic of the institutional setting of Chinese cultural diplomacy is that both the central and provincial external cultural exchanges are planned, lead and supervised by the central government, and apply “a segment with two titles” pattern. That is, a Chinese cultural institution usually has two identifications in order to show its responsibility for not only the government but also for the Party.

²⁷² In five advisory committees and eight deputies of Canadian Heritage, most of them are mainly in charge of the state’s domestic cultural affairs, while only one segment also takes care of international affairs.

The differences in institutional structure and the details between two states may relate to their different political cultures. Canada inherits Western culture and political thoughts. Within it, the notion of “limited government” plays a crucial role.²⁷³ This archetypal Western political cultural concept refers to a constitutional restriction of the government’s size, power, function, etc.²⁷⁴ The setting around Canadian cultural diplomatic institutions may reflect the influence of this culture.²⁷⁵ In order to not expand the existing size and function of its government, the Canadian government does not choose to construct special institutions to be in charge of said government. Instead, a pattern of inter-ministerial cooperation, led by the original cultural department and external trade department, is applied. Cooperation among departments is usually temporary in order to deal with a specific program or issue. In this case, the size, function, and power distribution among existing departments is maintained, while special cultural diplomatic tasks can still be accomplished.

Such a relation to culture is also expressed in the Chinese case. Special institutions are established and formulate relatively independent operative systems. The responsibility and working areas are also clarified. This institutional pattern may refer to China’s long standing bureaucratic culture. In traditional Chinese political culture, ideal governance, the so called “*Chuigong erzhi*” (Govern the country only by distributing

²⁷³ Graham White, “Big Is Different from Little: On Taking Size Seriously in the Analysis of Canadian Governmental Institutions,” *Canadian Public Administration*, vol. 33 (1990):530.

²⁷⁴ Philip Resnick, *Parliament vs. People: An Essay on Democracy and Canadian Political Culture* (Vancouver : New Star Books, 1984), 70.

²⁷⁵ See William Smith, *The Evolution of Government in Canada* (Montreal: Gazette printing company, 1928); John Calvert, *Government, Limited: The Corporate Takeover of the Public Sector in Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1984); External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation(Canada), *Smart Regulation, A Regulatory Strategy for Canada: Executive Summary, Report to the Government of Canada* (Ottawa : External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, 2004); Robert R. Owens, “The Unlimited Blessings of Limited Government,” *Canadian Free Press*, June 20th, 2010, accessed Dec. 27th, 2010, <http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/24488>.

duties) is a situation wherein every matter is dealt with by specific sections of the bureaucratic system, so that the top leader can govern the whole country merely by managing several main sections of the system. Relating to this political notion is a vast and complex bureaucratic system, in which every task is assigned to a special agency, from top to bottom, from central to outpost. The institutional setting of Chinese cultural diplomacy responds to this pattern.

Hence, in terms of these connections, the thesis argues there are relations between cultural difference and cultural diplomatic difference in an institutional setting of cultural diplomacy. Nevertheless, this perspective does not overlook the potential effects of other factors on Canadian and Chinese institutional settings or their cultural diplomatic departments such as “national polity.” From the perspective of national polity, Canada is a federation, “with a division of powers between two levels of government such that neither is subordinate to the other.”²⁷⁶ This model of government may serve as a reason for the power distribution of cultural diplomacy between central and provincial governments in Canada and the strong autonomy of provincial governments regarding their own cultural diplomacies.²⁷⁷ Likewise, “a segment with two titles,” the character of Chinese cultural institutions may relate to the centralized policy of the state. In the present Chinese political structure, the government is a regime “ideologically, politically, and organizationally” led by the CPC.²⁷⁸ This structure causes the close and indivisible relationship between the Party and the government, and therefore, between their

²⁷⁶ Rand Dyck, *Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches* (Toronto; Albany: Nelson Canada, 1996), 220.

²⁷⁷ This may also be an important reason for the cultural separatist crisis of Canada. See *Ibid.*, 31, and Heather MacIvor, *Parameters of Power: Canada's Political Institutions* (Australia; Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2006), 8-10.

²⁷⁸ “The Way Party Practices Leadership,” accessed Dec. 27th, 2010, <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/134999/135000/8110523.html>.

segments. Chinese cultural diplomatic institutions are bound to conform to this “party-government” structure. Hence, the “two-title segment” can be considered a reflection of the political structure of China.²⁷⁹ Of course, from another perspective, the differences of policy between two states can be regarded as the same cultural differences between Canada’s federalism and China’s centralist political tradition. The former may correspond to the “equal-autonomy” model in the institutional settings of Canadian cultural diplomacy. The latter may correspond to the “a segment with two titles” model in the Chinese case. Again, in this case, the relationship between cultural differences and cultural diplomatic differences in institutions is demonstrated.

6.2 A Comparison of Cultural Strategies

Analyses of the Canadian and Chinese cases manifest to show both are involved in the three basic pursuits of cultural strategy, i.e., constructing and enhancing a positive national image, protecting national cultural security, and benefiting economic and political affairs. These pursuits appear to have no obvious differences with regard to the two cases. In light of this, the influence of cultural characteristics may not be significant at this point. However, despite similar basic pursuits as far as concrete content, there are still differences between the cultural strategies of the two states.

In the Canadian cultural strategy, the protective aspect is highlighted. Since 1951, cultural defense has been added to its cultural strategy.²⁸⁰ As time went by, this defensive consciousness and vigilance regarding cultural intrusion from “an alien source” were not

²⁷⁹ Of course, the “party-government” structure may also relate to a type of political culture, yet the source of this culture is not Chinese traditions but Leninism. See Liu Dewei, “A Study of Lenin’s Party-leading Thought” (PhD diss., Central Party School, CPC, 2001), 15-27.

²⁸⁰ Government of Canada, “Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences.”

relieved but reinforced.²⁸¹ Comparatively, China appears to have a more active desire for cultural dissemination. In its cultural strategy, the “Go-out” thought is ranked as the top item, and the importance of national image and the international influence of culture are usually iterated.²⁸² Additionally, China actively constructs an appropriate environment to “attract foreign cultural groups and cultural productions.”²⁸³ Of course, the protective element is also involved. However, aside from Canada’s relatively negative defense, China may prefer to reinforce its cultural security by enhancing cultural vigor and cultural influence in the world.

These differences between Canadian and Chinese cultural strategy may relate to cultural differences of two states, especially when referring to the different international conditions of culture. As mentioned, the main body of Canadian politics and culture is a portion of the dominant politics and culture of the world. Hence, in either political development or cultural issues, Canada is seldom differentiated from dominant Western powers. This cultural condition, on the one hand, has the state rarely being censured by leading powers of the international society, while, on the other hand, it causes difficulties for Canada in “sustaining its cultural independence.”²⁸⁴ This, therefore, brings more anxiety and vigilance to Canada regarding its national cultural security and independence. This may be one reason why the state pays more attention to protecting culture in its cultural strategy.

²⁸¹ Thompson, “Canada’s Quest for Cultural Sovereignty,” 269-84

²⁸² Meng Xiaosi, “China: Cultural Diplomacy Shows its Power.”

²⁸³ Jin Yuanpu and Zhuang Jiangang, “How can China Deal with the Cultural ‘Trade Deficit.’”

²⁸⁴ John Pierce, et al. *Political Culture and Public Policy in Canada and the United States: Only a Border Apart?* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), 193.

Comparatively, Chinese culture has a different international environment. It is essentially different from Western culture, which yields a strong independence from the culture. Yet, if China wants to enter the existing international system, it must devote itself to making its own culture compatible and acceptable to dominant cultural powers. In terms of this, it is understandable why China expresses an enormous enthusiasm to publicizing its culture. To some extent, this stems from its pursuit to deepen other states' understanding of Chinese culture, and to highlight the common ground between different cultures so as to have others agree with the validity of Chinese culture. This is also consistent with the logic explained by the "soft power" theory: the effect of a state's soft power usually has to do with its cultural influence, while the cultural influence closely relates to whether target states can understand the culture and values sent by the cultural diplomatic practical state, i.e. "how they are hearing your messages."²⁸⁵

In summary, the different emphases in cultural strategy between the two states are consistent with the various conditions of their cultures. Nevertheless, their relationship with culture cannot deny the potential effects of other factors, such international power distribution, on the differences of the two states' cultural strategy. The various positions of Canada and China in contemporary international distribution and their different relations to dominant world powers may also correspond to their differences in cultural strategy. As an ally of the U.S. and a middle power, Canada does not need to run against the international norms and principles constructed by the U.S. and other Western states. But Canada has to follow existing international rules and suffer the disadvantages the

²⁸⁵ Nye, *Soft Power*, 111, 124.

rules bring to it.²⁸⁶ This may be one reason why Canada need not worry about its national image and propositions and actions in international society such as being attacked while maintaining vigilance over cultural intrusions from powerful Western cultures via market or other channels. As for China, the situation is different. As an emerging world power and potential challenger, it is easily vigilant and hostile towards both the existing world dominate powers and regional competitors. Hence, a situation is created wherein, without sufficient strength to ignore all antagonistic emotions and actions, China may be actively disseminating its culture in order to obtain acceptance from other members of the international society, especially dominant powers.²⁸⁷

In terms of the above analyses, Canadian and Chinese cultural strategic differences may relate to both cultural and power factors.

6.3 A Comparison of the Practical Processes of Cultural Diplomacy

Comparisons of the corresponding aspects of the practical processes of Canadian and Chinese cultural diplomacy reveal two main differences.

In practical terms, Canadian cultural diplomacy shows a conspicuous preference to international regime, which actually has been regarded as a Canadian diplomatic tradition.²⁸⁸ On the one hand, the state complies with the rules and restrictions of international regimes, even if the regimes bring about an inconvenience for the state with regard to protecting its culture. On the other hand, Canada is good at not only adjusting

²⁸⁶ That is also why it caused a serious dispute when Canada participated in the Afghan War. Many comments argued the action of Canada can bring the state nothing but damaging its usually positive national image in the international society. See Steven Staples and Bill Robinson, *Canada's Fallen: Understanding Canadian Military Deaths in Afghanistan* (Ottawa, Ont.: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2006); Gordon Smith, *Canada in Afghanistan: Is It Working?* (Calgary, Alta.: Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2007); and Peter Pigott, *Canada in Afghanistan: the War So Far* (Toronto, ON: Dundurn Group, 2007), 184.

²⁸⁷ Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese's Soft Power," 28-9.

²⁸⁸ Pierce, et al. *Political Culture and Public Policy in Canada and the United States*, 57.

domestic policies to fit international rules but also at drumming up support to modify the international norms in a direction to benefit itself. Comparatively, again in practical terms, China may apply more unilateral publicities or bilateral cultural exchanges and trades. Of course, China is also active in international organizations but adopts a different way of conveying its cultural notions through statements made by political leaders at international meetings rather than utilizing the existing rules of the regimes, as does Canada. Also, China has the enthusiasm to undertake large-scale international sports, cultural, or arts conferences so as to attract the world to China, and to disseminate Chinese culture to the world. Moreover, as one of the leading powers in the region, China prefers to act as an initiator and leader in the construction of regional regimes. The above noted practical patterns are rarely utilized in Canadian cultural diplomacy.

A few different cultural characteristics between two states may correspond to these differences. “International institutionalism” is one of Canada’s core political cultural elements.²⁸⁹ It refers to “a passion for creating international institutions to govern relations among countries and their citizens.”²⁹⁰ This culture may relate to the Canadian political preference of respecting and promoting existing international regimes. In the process of continually maintaining and promoting international regimes, Canada has also accumulated the experience to effectively utilize these regimes in order to realize its own interests and pursuits. By contrast, as the latecomer and the non-ally of the dominators of the existing regimes, China has few experiences and less enthusiasm to offer the established regimes. Historically, being identified as a latecomer and an ordinary participator is not China’s conventional role. In the majority of the state’s history, China

²⁸⁹ Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, 21.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 24.

usually acted as the founder and leader (“suzerain state”) of the China-centered international systems.²⁹¹ Thus, in many instances, when not positioned in the center of a system, China prefers to choose a non-alignment strategy.²⁹² Even when occasionally joining an alliance, China still maintained adequate independence.²⁹³ This sort of political tradition/culture may be helpful in understanding China’s current cultural actions in the existing international regimes. China does not want to simply be a follower, but has a need to participate in the contemporary international system. Hence, one option for China may be to publicize its political and cultural propositions, and increase other members’ understanding and acceptance of its culture and political pursuits. On one hand, China can maintain their independence and distinctiveness of culture; on the other hand, it can increase the acceptance of their existing system in China. In this perspective, the cultural characteristics of Canada and China correspond to their features of the practice means of cultural diplomacy.

Over and above the correspondences with different cultural characteristics, the thesis discovers that the discrepancy of diplomatic practical means may also relate to the different roles of the two states in international relations. As a “middle power”, Canada “can be active in several places, but within limits.”²⁹⁴ On behalf of its own interests, and also to “constrain[ing] the major powers from going it alone,” particularly, its “much larger and then menacing neighbor—the United States,” to apply “a dense web of

²⁹¹ Jeanne Boden, *The Wall behind China's Open Door towards Efficient Intercultural Management in China* (Brussels: Academic and Scientific Publishers, 2008), 31-2; and David Kang, *East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 11-6.

²⁹² Shi Jiazhu, “On the Establishment and Development of the Chinese Non Alignment Policy,” *Journal of Liaoning Normal University (Social Science Edition)* vol.23:2 (2002):28-9.

²⁹³ Jia Qingguo, “The Changes in Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Thoughts and Impacts on International Relations,” *World Economics and Politics* vol. 11 (1989): 47-8.

²⁹⁴ Kirton, *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, 54.

multilateral processes, institutions, and rules” may be one of its optimal choices.²⁹⁵ As for China, as an emerging power, it must pursue more support from members of the international society in order to restrain the restriction and intervention of existing major powers. In this case, frequent reciprocal cultural exchanges and trades and extensive publicity of its own cultural notions and propositions seems an effective means. In the meantime, as a regionally significant power, China has more than adequate influence with which to construct regional regimes and rules in order to satisfy its own developmental needs.

The other obvious difference between the diplomatic practices of the two states is in their practical contents. Generally, in Canadian cultural diplomacy, the Western cultural elements and political values, such as freedom of speech, open market principles, human rights, and multiculturalism, are disseminated.²⁹⁶ Hence, from this aspect, the relationship between Canadian culture and its cultural diplomacy is direct and conspicuous. Further study suggested the content and emphases of Canadian cultural diplomatic practices are not only different from Chinese cultural diplomacy but are also not the same within the different Canadian governments. For example, in both Pierre Trudeau’s and Jean Chrétien’s eras, the protective function and necessity of cultural diplomacy were frequently emphasized, while, following Paul Martin’s era, the weight of cultural diplomacy has gradually shifted in its functions in order to promote economic profits in cultural trades.²⁹⁷ This perhaps relates some subtle differences in the political

²⁹⁵ Ibid., 25, 54.

²⁹⁶ Wiseman, *In Search*, 71.

²⁹⁷ Mark, “A Comparative Study,” 89.

ideas of their leaders and their administrations. Thus, it may serve as indirect evidence as to the relationship between culture and diplomatic practice.

This too is the case in the development of Chinese cultural diplomacy practices. Roughly, both Chinese political development and its ideology have experienced two periods. The founding of PRC, in the 1970s, was the first period. In this time frame, Maoism is the dominant ideology of China, and cultural diplomacy was generally subordinate to “publicizing workers, peasants and soldiers” and for “the cause of the proletariat world revolutionary.”²⁹⁸ This situation did not change until 1979.²⁹⁹ The 1980s, to the present, is the second period in which development became the core of state policy. Correspondingly, “cultural and ideological progress” is upgraded from its subordinate position, and obtains an equal status as “material progress.”³⁰⁰ In Jiang Zeming’s report in the Sixteenth Central Committee of CPC, the term “Three Represents” was raised, in which cultural development was evaluated as one of three core missions of the governance of the Communism Party of China.³⁰¹ Cultural diplomacy was also connected with constructing a national image and promoting cultural business. In a recent statement from CPC and a government work report, cultural development was also posed as a relatively independent and crucial task for the next course of governance.³⁰² Cultural

²⁹⁸ Mao Zedong, “Talks at the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art,” 86.

²⁹⁹ Zhou Yang, “Carry forward the Cause and Forge Ahead into the Future, Flourish the Socialist Arts in the New Epoch” (paper presented at the Fourth Chinese Writers and Artists Conference, November, 1979).

³⁰⁰ CCCPC, “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” (paper published at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, Jun. 27th, 1981).

³⁰¹ Jiang Zemin, “Comprehensively Build Prosperous Society, Initiate New Situation of Socialist Construction,” (paper presented at the Sixteenth Central Committee of CPC, Nov. 8th, 2002).

³⁰² See Hu Jintao, “Holding High the Great Banner of Socialism, Struggle for the New Success of the Construction of Comprehensive Prosperous Society” (paper presented at the Seventeenth Central Committee of CPC, Oct. 15th, 2007), and Wen Jiabao, “The Report on the Work of the Government” (paper presented at the Third Session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress, Mar. 5th, 2010).

diplomacy then serves as a main approach to publicize the new ideological notion, “harmonious development” and “harmonious world.”³⁰³

As with the Canadian case, the contents of Chinese cultural diplomacy have a significant relation with its culture, which is also the cause of its differences within the practices of Canadian cultural diplomacy. For instance, core values, such as “harmony,” “stability,” “non-offensiveness” (*Wu-zheng*), and “good-neighborly relationship and partnership” (*Yulin weishan, Yilin weiban*), in the context of Chinese cultural diplomatic practices express the strong values of Chinese traditional culture. Although certain aspects of Chinese values may have similarities with some Western cultural ideas or values, they essentially stem from different cultures.

6.4 A Comparison of Phasic Results of Cultural Diplomacy

This thesis investigates the phasic results of Canadian and Chinese cultural diplomacies by employing relevant statistics, reports and surveys. According to the investigations, both states’ cultural diplomatic practices have gained in achievements.

With relevant foreign policies and diplomatic actions, the cultural industry of Canada was, in a sense, protected. More importantly, by utilizing effective diplomatic actions, protection has finally been adopted as a norm in regional and worldwide international organizations. In the meantime, active participation in constructing and maintaining international institutions also bestows a positive national image upon Canada. This is also the case with Chinese cultural diplomacy. China’s national image has improved partially due to considerable profits gained from cultural exchanges and trade. Now, China successfully attracts the worlds’ attention through continual publicities

³⁰³ Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard ed. *“Harmonious World,”* 3.

and actions, and has become one of the most popular states for trade, educational exchanges, and cultural communications. In international society, the influence of Chinese culture has been enhanced.

However, these achievements seem not to have changed the cultural positions of the two states.

As far as Canada is concerned, the U.S. and other great Western cultural powers still threaten the cultural security of the two states and the development of their cultural industries. Accordingly, the effect of protective policies and actions on Canadian cultural business is limited. The potential inner crisis with respect to the national culture of Canada is also unresolved. China faces a similar situation. Although China may not have to worry about its cultural independence and unification, as does Canada, China and Chinese culture are, as yet, not completely accepted by current international society, particularly by its dominant powers. China's low popularity in the Western states also indicates the cultural position of China has yet to change. The vigilances and hostilities from both dominant world powers and regional competitors still affect a state's influence and its culture in the region or in the world.

In terms of the comparison above, the phasic results of cultural diplomacies of the two states may be considered generally identical—by incorporating diplomatic practices, achievements are reached while not essentially changing the cultural positions of the state. A mere difference between the two states may be in the threats they face, while the cultural differences of Canada and China seems to have a limited impact on this aspect. Instead, different power positions of the two states appear more corresponding to their respective threats. As an ally of current dominant world powers, Canada is the target of

few threats and yet, as a middle power, it endures outside pressures on Canadian cultural industry and independence. As an emerging world power and potential challenger, China faces threats from existing dominant world powers and regional competitors although its developed cultural system secures its cultural independence and distinctiveness, for the most part. In short, the power factor represents a relatively strong connection with the cultural position of the two states and their cultural characteristics.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

According to the comparative studies cited above, although Canadian and Chinese cultural diplomatic practices have some commonalities, there are many differences. This thesis investigates the relations of these differences to the cultural differences of the two states, and to other factors. The conclusion is that cultural diplomatic differences between the two states are relative to their cultural differences. On the other hand, some non-cultural factors, such as power and international relations, may also work to form discrepancies in the two states' cultural diplomatic practices. Awareness of these relations may contribute to a better understanding of the role of culture in the formulations and practices of a state's cultural diplomacy.

7.1 A Comparative Study of Cultural Diplomacy

This thesis intends to apply an appropriate approach with which to study the differences of cultural diplomacy between different states and the relations of these differences to the cultural differences between states. A review of existing studies is given, which not only uncovers the defects of the present study of cultural diplomacy, but suggests an advantage to utilizing a comparative approach in the research area. Hence, considering both the complexity in the formulating and practicing processes of cultural diplomacy and the purpose of the particular research, this thesis constructs a specific analytical framework with which to practice comparisons of cultural diplomacy between different states and seeks their relations to culture. This framework focuses mainly on three questions:

Firstly, *what types of diplomatic behaviors are studied?* The thesis focuses on a unique form of modern diplomacy called “cultural diplomacy.” A dual-level definition of “cultural diplomacy” is given, which indicates cultural diplomacy includes all nonviolent foreign actions by or for cultural protections, dissemination, and exchanges. It may refer to the diplomatic practices of official agencies of a central government of a state (basic level), or the practices of various practitioners—governmental or non-governmental, groups or individuals (broad level). Yet, the thesis focuses more on the basic level. The main feature of this diplomatic form is the application of culture.

Secondly, *what items of cultural diplomacy are in the comparison?* For the purpose of research, this thesis investigated and compared four aspects of a case states’ cultural diplomacy, i.e. institutional setting, cultural strategy, diplomatic practical process, and phasic result.

Thirdly, *what types of cases are selected?* Taking into consideration the representativeness and comparative value, Canada and China are selected as the case studies. On one hand, they are neither top-ranking world powers nor peripheral members of the present international society. On the other hand, they are comparable according to their conditions, especially according to their conditions to practice cultural diplomacy. Also, they have respective distinctive cultural and diplomatic characteristics which increase their comparable values.

Based upon the constructed framework, the thesis conducts a specific comparative study, with which to explore cultural diplomatic differences between different states, and their relationship to cultural differences.

7.2 The Relationship between Cultural Diplomatic Difference and Cultural

Difference

According to the case analyses and comparisons, differences exist within most aspects of Canadian and Chinese cultural diplomacies, and some have conspicuous relations with the cultural differences of the two states. On the other hand, the potential effects of non-cultural factors on cultural diplomacy, such as states' national policies, power, and relations with other states, are noted.

To be specific, within an institutional setting, Canadian and Chinese cultural diplomacy have obvious differences in institutional structure and operational models. Within these differences, the structural discrepancies show clear corresponding relations with the different characteristics of the political cultures of the two states. The "limited-government" perception in Canadian political culture and the bureaucratic traditions of China, respectively, relate to the structural characteristics in cultural diplomatic institutions of the two states. In a sense, this exploration demonstrates the implication of many existing theories, such as cultural imperialism theory, "the end of history" theory, and several studies regarding democratization. In varying degrees, these theories suggest that changing the political system of a state could be realized by changing its political culture, e.g., accepting Western democratic values or open market principles may lead to the democratization of governmental institutions—because the setting of a state's political system is related to the characteristics of its political culture, according to the above noted discovery of cultural diplomacy.

Yet, the thesis also notes that the relations between cultural diplomatic differences in institutions and differences in state policies are also exposed. For instance, the "a segment with two titles" pattern may be relative to China's "party-government" political

model. This perspective suggests culture is not the only variable influencing a state's institutional model. Political conditions and needs may also impart an important impact on a state's operational model. This implies that the acceptance of elements of a type of culture and ideology (for example, partially accepted open market principles) is less of a sufficient condition than a necessary condition to cause changes to states' basic political systems (such as democratization). In this case, structural transformations may not occur when a certain political system, based upon a certain culture (for example, democratic governments based upon Western culture), does not fit or satisfy a state's political conditions or needs (such as a weak socioeconomic basis or the need for economic development and social stability).

In the study of cultural strategy, both Canadian and Chinese cultural strategies include three basic pursuits. Thus, the posted hypothesis, based upon cultural internationalism and imperialism theories, largely demonstrates (based upon the two cases) a state's cultural strategy usually involving three basic pursuits, i.e., constructing and enhancing a positive national image, protecting national cultural security, and benefiting from economic and political affairs. The three pursuits would not change regardless of what culture the diplomatic practices applied to or were relied on. On the other hand, the comparison reveals differences in the emphases and concrete contents between Canadian and Chinese cultural strategies, in spite of their shared basic pursuits. Two factors express relations with these differences—the different *cultural* positions of the two states in the international cultural structure and the different *power* positions of the states in the international power structure. This discovery coordinates the points made by social constructivism theory and some existing cultural diplomatic studies. Social

constructivists take into consideration the cultural relation of a state as it pertains to others in international society, essentially inducing the state's foreign actions; cultural interactions among states formulate their basic identities and mutual relations. The relationship between culture and the content of states' cultural strategy partially support this viewpoint, since cultural strategy is a state's guideline for its foreign cultural diplomatic practices and the study manifests the fact it is related to the cultural characteristics and conditions of a state. However, other studies, such as "soft power" theory and the contents Mitchell discussed in his analysis of a Japanese case, infer a state's cultural diplomacy is also influenced by internal and external political conditions.³⁰⁴ The studied result of this thesis in regard to the relation of cultural strategy with power factors buttresses this viewpoint.

In the *practical process*, the comparison uncovers two different aspects, practical means and practical contents, in the Canadian case and the Chinese case. The different favorable means in Canadian and Chinese cultural diplomacies have a clear corresponding relationship to Canada's international institutionalism political culture and China's conventional political roles in its history. However, the power factor also shows an influence upon these differences. The study exposes different means selections which may be related to different power positions of the two states in international structure. This conclusion expresses, again, the relation of cultural diplomacy to both cultural and non-cultural factors. In practical contents, the differences between the two cases have to do with both the differences between cultural contents of the two states and the different cultural and ideological themes in different periods of either state's political history.

³⁰⁴ Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations*, 231-40.

Actually, several international political cultural studies, such as civilizational clash theory and cultural friction theory, have suggested the perspective of this conclusion. The theories argue cultural difference is a crucial reason for the different identities and behaviors of states in international relations. The conclusion of this thesis then deepens the understanding of this relationship between culture and actions of states. That is, culture may influence the behavioral patterns of foreign actions of a state by relating to its behavioral guideline and purposes (cultural strategy) and behavioral objects (practice contents of cultural diplomacy).

Finally, in the comparison of phasic results of Canadian and Chinese cultural diplomacies, the practices of the cultural diplomacies of both states obtain several achievements. At the same time, neither state's achievements appear sufficient to essentially change their cultural powers or resolve the cultural threats toward them. The differences between the two cases may be only in the concrete threats toward the two states. Canada and China suffer various cultural problems, while the study indicates this difference has less to do with their cultural difference and more to do with their power differences and their differences in international relations with other states, especially with dominant world powers. Non-cultural factors have shown to be effective in many aspects of cultural diplomacy, as discussed above. But with respect to the aspect of phasic result, they express a stronger relationship with cultural diplomacy than with cultural factors. Thus, this conclusion may provide a more comprehensive understanding as to the effect of cultural influence from the perspective of "soft power" theory. The "soft power" theory indicates that the influence of culture can be restricted by a state's political conditions, e.g., power and international relations with other states. According to the

study of this thesis, this restriction may be universal, because in all three case studies, a superpower (made by “soft power” theory), a middle power (made by this thesis), and an emerging world power (created via this thesis) are shown.

7.3 Conclusion and Implications

In summary, an investigation into the four aspects of Canadian and Chinese cultural diplomacies indicates the various differences between cultural diplomacies of states have some common ground such as the basic pursuit of their cultural strategy. Many of the differences have relations with the cultural differences. In view of this point, the varied differences among the details of cultural diplomacy of states may be considered as a type of “homogeneity.” That is, the cultural diplomacy of a state is entirely relative to its cultural characteristics.

Many existing theories do not clearly and comprehensively answer the question “is the influence of culture on the foreign actions of a state based only on the common features of cultures, or is it based on the distinctive characteristics of various cultures?” The answer, according to this study, is, besides the influence of the common features of cultures, a state’s own cultural characteristics also work in accordance with the foreign actions of states—cultural diplomacies of different states are different, and these differences are relative to their cultural differences.

Another important fact included in the conclusion has to do with non-cultural factors. Many results of the study have shown non-cultural factors such as power, international relations, and so on, also have relations with the characteristics of a state’s cultural diplomacies, such as the operational model of cultural diplomatic institutions, the contents of cultural strategy, the means selection of cultural diplomatic practices, and the

effect of cultural diplomatic achievements upon states. These relations behoove not being overlooked, even when the focus is placed on cultural factors. But on the other hand, the potential influence of non-cultural factors cannot conceal the relations of the diplomatic practices within cultural factors. Based upon this study, questions as to which factor may have a more significant influence, or which relationship (with cultural or non-cultural factors) will play a key role within diplomacy practices, can be asked in the future,

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
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I Organizational Structure of the Department of Canadian Heritage


2008-09³⁰⁵




³⁰⁵ Source: ERICarts, *Compendium: Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe* (Country Profile: Canada, Council of Europe/ERICarts, 2008), 4.

APPENDIX II Canadian Rank of Contributors to UN Peacekeeping³⁰⁶

[1] CANADA'S RANK AMONG CONTRIBUTORS TO UN PEACEKEEPING



[5] CANADIAN POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ON UN MISSIONS



³⁰⁶ Source: WPMC, "Canadian & UN Peacekeeping," *Peace Build*, accessed Jan. 18th, 2011, www.worldfederalistscanada.org/WPMCnews/documents/peacekeeping.pdf.

APPENDIX III The Market Share of Foreign Media Products in Canada (2004)³⁰⁷

Film	95% of cinematic theatre box office revenues (86% US and 9% other)
Books	46.6% of the industry's total domestic revenue (currently, no accurate figure is available as to the market share of foreign books in Canada. Instead, we traditionally use the revenue share of foreign publishers in Canada).
Periodicals	41% of sales (The vast majority of foreign titles circulating in Canada are US titles).
Sound recordings	75% of all sound recordings sold in Canada in 2004 by foreign artists. (The basis of the calculation is the top 2000 sales chart for the year. Only Canadian artists are identified. Foreign artists are not distinguished by country of origin).
Television	52% of the viewing share of English-language programming and 34% of French-language programming. The viewing shares of non-Canadian English-language and French-language drama and comedy are 80% and 65%, respectively (country of origin in data is identified as Canadian or non-Canadian).

³⁰⁷ Source: CRTC, *Broadcasting Policy Monitoring Report* (2007).

APPENDIX IV Main Duties of SCIO³⁰⁸

- (1) Promote the external publicities of the media regarding China, and conduct and coordinate external news reports;
- (2) Design plans for external press development, and manage their practices;
- (3) Manage publicities of the Chinese government's policies and socioeconomic developing status;
- (4) Promote Chinese media in order to report international affairs, including information regarding politics, economics, science and technology, and so on;
- (5) Hold press conferences with domestic and foreign journalists to publicize Chinese situations and policies;
- (6) Manage the printing and publication of works of the *Chinese Governmental White Book* which interprets the principles and basic policies of the Chinese government with regard to important events;
- (7) Supervise the work of provincial (regional and civic) government information offices, and provide services to journalists from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan regions;
- (8) Develop communications and cooperation with foreign press institutions, and providing services to foreign journalists;
- (9) Care for important delegations and individuals who applied to visit the Office;
- (10) Manage internet press undertakings, and conduct and coordinate internet press works;
- (11) Preside over the publicizing of developments within China's human rights undertakings, and organize international communications and cooperation in the area of human rights;
- (12) Preside over the publicities regarding the development of Tibet, and organize relevant external reports and international communications;
- (13) Study the public sentiments from international media, and of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan regions;
- (14) Organize large comprehensive, trans-segmental, or trans-regional cultural communications, and manage the publication of books, audio-video products, films and TV programs regarding situations in China.

³⁰⁸ Source: SCIO, "State Council Information Office of People's Republic of China," accessed Apr. 22nd, 2010, <http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwbjs/xwbjs/200905/t306817.htm>.

APPENDIX V Main Duties of BECR³⁰⁹

- (1) Guide and administer international cultural exchanges and cultural communications, stipulating policies and related drafting;
- (2) Draft related laws and regulations with respect to cultural exchange with foreign countries and Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan regions;
- (3) Instruct the work of cultural offices under Chinese Embassies and Consulates around the world and the Central Government's representative offices in Hong Kong SAR and Macao SAR;
- (4) Guide and administer the work of Chinese Cultural Centers in foreign countries;
- (5) Administer foreign cultural centers in China;
- (6) Organize cultural exchanges with Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan regions;
- (7) Prepare the signing of cultural cooperation agreements and programs with foreign countries on behalf of the State;
- (8) Organize major international cultural exchange activities at home and abroad.

³⁰⁹ Source: BECR, "The Bureau for External Cultural Relations and Office for Cultural Affairs with Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Regions," accessed Apr. 22nd, 2010, www.ccnt.gov.cn/English/jgsz/bjg/200904/t20090428_62710.html.

APPENDIX VI Main Duties of Culture Sections and Groups in Chinese Embassies³¹⁰

- (1) Coordinate national segments which are responsible for external cultural intercourses, and participate in works with regard to arranging and signing cultural cooperation agreements, practicing cultural year programs, cultural current projects, and so forth with stationed countries;
- (2) Coordinate relevant national segments running cultural communication and cooperation plans;
- (3) Coordinate mutual visitation exchanges between the Chinese and stationed countries' artists, scholars, experts, and cultural organizations, and provide assistance to those individuals and organizations;
- (4) Offer published materials to the public and cultural organizations;
- (5) Legally investigate the cultural status, experiences, and problems of stationed countries.

³¹⁰ Source: Liao Kaijin, "A Study of Chinese Cultural Diplomacy" (PhD diss, the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, 2006) 102.